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ABSTRACT 
Tactical space support has earned a reputation as unresponsive and the Operationally 
Responsive Space Office was created in 2007 to address this for the military.  The intent of this 
course project is to use an educational research approach to develop a future architecture that 
will make space responsive in 2025.  This paper evaluates the shortcomings that hinder quick 
and effective space-based support to the U.S. Military and Intelligence Community.  The current 
space community is fragmented; preventing quick, unified decisions, and does not have the 
executive clout necessary to lead effectively. Our group’s solution creates a Department of Space 
at the cabinet level.  The Department of Space will unify the space community, promoting 
quicker decisions with one common and consistent vision.  This change would enable unified 
plans and policies as well as allow one organization to prioritize all of the space programs.  The 
responsive culture would facilitate other needed changes to Space Operations, Launch and 
Acquisition. 
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SS4051 is the second course of a two course sequence which comprises the capstone 
project for the Space Systems Operations program at NPS.  SS3041, the initial course, teaches 
the students the architectural design process – from generating basic requirements through 
conceiving of and evaluating alternative solutions and ultimately selecting the preferred 
approach.  During SS3041, the students are presented a project – derived from current 
challenging and relevant efforts in the National Security Space area – and their primary 
“deliverable” at the completion of the class is a set of requirements for the assigned architecture 
to satisfy. 
For the FY2008 effort, Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) was selected as the topic 
of study.  In SS3041, the students defined what ORS “should be,” and described the 
characteristics and capabilities of an ORS architecture.  In SS4051, the students took these 
definitions and capabilities and generated alternative approaches to satisfying them.  This report 
describes the result of that effort. 
For FY2008, there were two in-residence teams of 10 students, and a single distance-
learning team of 7 students.  While most of the in-residence students had no space-related 
experience other than their time in the Space Systems Program at NPS, the majority of the 
distance-learning students had worked in or were currently working in space-related jobs. 
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 Our group of 10 NPS Space Systems Operations Students was tasked to develop a space 
architecture that would be “responsive” by 2025.  We were given the responsibility to determine 
what Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) meant and how to get there. 
 The key to being responsive and reacting quickly is adapting our culture to fit that 
mindset.  Responsiveness as a mindset requires a complete shift in philosophy from our current 
risk-averse culture.  This shift in philosophy will require a complete overhaul of the National 
Security Space Enterprise (NSSE) to a one-leader structure.  That structure is the Department of 
Space.   
The current NSSE has fragmented leadership that is counterproductive to being 
responsive, let alone to developing a culture of responsiveness.  Unity of command will ensure 
that there is no ambiguity of responsibility or direction.  As we stand up the Department of 
Space, streamline its functions and instill a responsive mindset, we will need one leader. 
 The Department of Space is inevitable as we rely more and more on that medium to 
conduct business, travel and warfare.  Communications, navigation, early warning systems and 
space exploration are being joined by the budding space tourism business as how we use space.  
Managing all these facets will require one funding source and the clout of a cabinet level leader.  
We will eventually have to enact this change.  While creating the Department of Space now 
would be extremely difficult, pushing it off until later will be even more difficult and the 




Figure 1 Organizational Structure of the Department of Space 
 
The most important way to make the business of space responsive is to build that into the 
thought process of everyone in that organization.  If we indoctrinate people at every level 
towards the importance of responsiveness, they will develop their own solutions and implement 
them far more effectively than if we mandate them to work more quickly and micromanage each 
change.  With responsiveness as our organization mindset, the goal will be clear and results will 
follow. 
Part of a responsive mindset is training people to operate in a denied environment.  
Training will reduce the impact of losing space assets.  With our warfighters capable of 
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navigating and fighting with diminished GPS accuracy and reduced SATCOM, we are less 
vulnerable to our “Space Achilles Heel” (Crosier 19). 
Another key to being responsive is having survivable assets in orbit as well as on the 
ground.  Through Space Situational Awareness (SSA), Offensive Counter Space (OCS) and 
Defensive Counter Space (DCS), we prevent our assets from being rendered ineffective.  There 
is nothing more responsive to attack than spoiling that attack.   
Policies that enable responsive space will be enforced industry wide and perpetuate 
responsiveness.  With one leader laying down the vision, the space industry can move forward in 
a responsive direction.  The following policies will make space more responsive: 
• Mandatory spares for critical satellites will be made policy  
• Spare launch pads, launch vehicles and launch facilities will be required for certain 
missions 
• A common bus standard will be made available  
 
Fast technology integration is a key ingredient to being responsive.  We must be able to 
identify our shortcomings and quickly integrate new technologies to solve those problems.   
Acquisition is an important part of being responsive, and has had a history of being 
unresponsive.  In order to be more responsive to programs most critical to national importance, 
the acquisition system will have a method in place to rapidly complete critical projects. 
  xvi
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I.  EVOLUTION OF ORSB 
 In the winter quarter, in SS3041, our group determined WHAT Operationally Responsive 
Space is to us.  We decided the NSSE needed three offices to help focus its efforts in providing 
responsive space to the warfighter and the intelligence community.   The three offices were the 
Knowledge Center, the Launch Support Division and the Space Center of Excellence.  We broke 
down the responsibility of each office by functions and applied the missions from JP 3-14.  We 
decided to group the responses by temporal means as well, which we called the Response Tiers.  
Tier 1 is comprised of responses that take from minutes to days to take effect.  Tier 2 responses 
take weeks to months.  Tier 3 responses take months to years.  The three tiers were 
complemented by the three functional divisions: 
• Knowledge Center   (KC) 
• Launch Support Division (LSD) 
• Space Center of Excellence (SCOE) 
To clarify, Knowledge Center dealt mostly with tier one responses, but was not limited to 
that role.  Likewise Launch Support Division and Space Center of Excellence were nebulously 
tied to tier two and tier three responses respectively.  Our definition of Operationally Responsive 
Space: 
Provide on-order, space-based capacity to DoD/IC users in order to resolve identified 
urgent gaps during national or operational crisis using current technologies, utilizing the 
ORS Knowledge Center, Launch Support Division, and Space Center of Excellence. 
 
Beginning this quarter, we had to develop HOW we were going to make space 
responsive.  Initially we decided to continue the same path our group started in SS3041.  We 
started with the same definition, and we expanded our assumptions.  In order to provide 
responsive space in 2025 certain assumptions had to be made.  Although we never changed the 
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content, we ultimately changed the title.  The assumptions became known as “Our Vision.”  This 
is the vision that would enable a responsive environment: 
• Robust Offensive/Defensive Counter Space & SSA;  US response limits losses to enemy 
action 
• Global Information Grid (GIG) in space 
• Satellites hardened against Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP)/laser 
• IMINT/SIGINT systems healthy and capability has evolved 
• Robust and redundant Comm/PNT/ISR/Wx constellations exist 
• Commercial Systems augment National Systems and capability matches (current) 
DoD/IC 
• High Altitude Long Loiter (HALL) airships and Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) 
provide most theater ISR 
• Forces train as if in denied environment 
• Department of Space provides capability/services/capacity NOT analysis or intelligence 
products 
We started by designating roles for everyone in the group.  We first decided on a 
Program Manager: Maj Brian Anderson and his assistant LT Alex Bein.  We divided the rest of 
the group into three teams.  The Knowledge Center was led by LT Phil Smith with LCDR Sam 
Messer and LCDR Greg Fitzgearld on his team.  The Launch Support Division was led by Maj 
Gerry Gleckel with Maj Corey Collier and LT Rich Arledge on his team.  The Space Center of 
Excellence was led by LT Matt Crook with MAJ Alex Braszko on his team. 
Knowing WHAT we wanted ORS to be, we began focusing on HOW we wanted to get 
there.  Each team was responsible for determining their role in making space responsible.  The 
Knowledge Center focused on ways to disseminate information and train space customers so 
they would be prepared for any loss of capability.  Launch Support Division focused on ways to 
speed up the launch process.  The Space Center of Excellence focused on acquisition, plans and 
policy as well as technology development and integration. 
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In our first iteration, we decided not to focus on the four space missions from JP 3-14, 
because they were enveloped by our three output tiers.  The three tiers:  
• Tier 1 is an immediate response taking minutes to days. 
• Tier 2 is a mid term response taking weeks to months 
• Tier 3 is a long term response taking months to years 
In our second iteration, we eliminated the Knowledge Center, Launch Support Division 
and Space Center of Excellence as separate organizations and focused more on the tier functions.  
We eliminated these offices to avoid inserting more bureaucracy into the system; using the tiers 
to organize our efforts allowed us to use existing infrastructure.  This led us to adopt a new, more 
concise ORS definition:   
Provide threat-resistant space capacity to support DoD/IC users in a timely fashion. 
As we progressed, we realized that ORS requires a culture of responsiveness.  In order to 
have the authority to develop and enforce a culture across the entire NSSE we would need one 
leader.  We decided there is a need for that leader to be at the cabinet level.  A leader with such a 
high position is needed because space transcends the military, the intelligence community and 
commerce to merit is own cabinet level department, The Department of Space.  Once stood up, 
the Department of Space will be able to affect many changes that were unlikely without it.  In 
order to quantify the effects of the changes, we developed a Measure of Effectiveness (MoE) for 
each one.   
The next three sections will focus on the development of each of the three tiers. 
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A. DEVELOPMENT OF TIER 1 
The Knowledge Center, renamed ORS OPS very early in the quarter, was designed to 
satisfy most tier one needs.  It was designed to be an all encompassing operations center to 
handle emerging space crises, to promulgate situational awareness and to train end users.   
The struggle with the ORS OPS is how we can accommodate users in a quicker fashion 
than already exhibited.  We decided to offer twenty-four hour support in the fashion of a call 
center, a chat line and RSS feed.  The ORS OPS was also designed to inspect each of the end 
users for proficiency.  The constructive feedback we received from our professors was “this path 
was too far into the weeds and did not did not solve the larger scope of the problem.” 
After regrouping we decided to attack the problems more directly, and to go directly after 
the Tiers they most resembled.  ORS OPS converted most directly to Tier 1.  Tier 1 is an 
immediate response gauged in minutes to days.  We focused on those capabilities that would 
allow us to be responsive in minutes to days: 
• Augment or replace capacity/capability 
• Warfighter must train in a denied environment 
• Maintain Space Operational and Situational Awareness 
We decided to concentrate on Space Operational and Situational Awareness.  In order to 
protect our space assets we would need to know when they are in danger.  This would require a 
complete network that could monitor the entire orbit.  Once we know where and when the threats 
are, we need a way to thwart them.  Without going too far into the weeds we discussed decoys, 
maneuver, and focused projectiles from the satellite being attacked.  This established Offensive 
Counter Space and Defensive Counter Space as important divisions under the Operations 
Department.  Even if we cannot react to prevent the loss of the satellite, we can mitigate its 
effects by augmenting or replacing that capability quicker.   
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Critical satellites need to be hardened against attack and the space environment.  
Satellites most important to national defense need to be resistant to solar flares and EMP.  They 
must also be hardened to defeat lasers and jamming.  Our satellites are big targets to our 
adversaries, and we must reduce their vulnerability.   
We also focused on data management.  Every user will have communication with the 
Operation Centers via the Space Operations Command Center.  The operation center will have 
communication with every ground station via the managers for that functional intelligence 
collection area (i.e. ELINT, SIGINT, IMINT).  Ground stations will have communication with a 
specific satellite with the potential to be a back-up for other platforms with configurable software 
with well-defined interfaces. 
Tier 1 will be enforcing the training of end users to operate with and without space assets 
and satellite operators to react to rapid tasking or emergencies.  Training the end users to operate 
without space assets minimizes the effects in the case of an actual loss of space assets.  Training 
the operators ensures pre-planned responses (PPRs) can be quickly executed with maximum 
effect. 
B. DEVELOPMENT OF TIER 2 
The Launch Support Division was set up to organize launch to maximize its 
responsiveness.  In the current system there are many potential bottlenecks that can hold up a 
launch.  We looked for ways to eliminate those bottlenecks.  Then we decided which methods 
were most responsive and cost effective. 
Launch looked at four areas that are most likely to impact the timeliness and 
responsiveness of launch: 
• Payload 
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• Launch facility 
• Launch vehicle 
• Integration and testing 
For the payload, we looked at keeping spares of each satellite type on the ground ready 
for launch, we considered a new acquisition process for each new satellite, and we considered 
having a common bus for all satellites for quicker integration. 
To alleviate some of the bottlenecks and improve responsiveness at our launch facilities 
we considered a variety of options.  We recognized the disparity of organizations and 
management at the current launch sites and considered unifying all launch facilities under one 
command.  In order to expand our possible volume of launches and develop redundant facilities, 
we looked at building more launch pads at the existing Federal and commercial spaceports as 
well as building new sites from scratch.  We examined allocating sites by orbit and mission type.  
We also looked at the idea of keeping pads reserved for emergency high priority launches.  
Lastly, we thought of increasing our launch bases physical security with air patrols and missile 
defense. 
We recognized that while the launch vehicles themselves are not unresponsive, their 
availability may be.  To make them more responsive we considered the possibility of storing 
extra launch vehicles at the launch bases.  We could also maintain a higher level of readiness on 
our launch vehicles.  We could also invest money into cheaper and better launch technologies, 
ultimately leading to improved launch vehicles. 
To make integration and testing more responsive we looked at having more facilities at 
launch bases and designing satellite processing for a quicker integration.  We also looked at how 
satellites are processed today and considered how crews are managed. 
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After our next iteration we dropped the name Launch Support Division and called it Tier 
2 to be consistent with the rest of the groups.  We still decided to focus heavily on the launch 
portion of the process, since that is an area that could use a lot more responsiveness.  We 
evaluated a variety of responsive enabling options for the following Tier 2 functions: 
• Satellite availability 
• Facilities – processing and pads 
• Launch vehicle availability 
• Integration and test timelines 
 
With some preliminary decisions, we ruled out some of the less responsive options.  We 
decided to further evaluate: spares, building more launch facilities at existing launch bases, 
causes for launch delays.  The next step was to estimate the cost of making them more 
responsive.  The cost of building additional spares would vary by satellite program.  Based on 
recent Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) pad renovations, we estimated the cost of 
adding an additional flexible launch facility at around $500 million.   
To be more responsive we need to reduce launch delays.  Over the last several years there 
were a wide variety of causes for launch delays.  Cost, software problems, hardware problems, 
abnormal tests and even debris from ASATs have caused delays in U.S. based launches.  We 
decided that there was little we could do to eliminate launch delays, but by being flexible, we 
could limit the impact felt on further down the line.  For the final iteration we re-evaluated all of 
the ideas that can make space more responsive: 
• Having a centralized launch site authority 
• Enforcing mandatory spares for critical satellites  
• Enforcing mandatory spares for launch vehicles 
• Providing a common bus for testing, development and science. 
• Enforcing a regular launch schedule 
• Adding more flexible launch pads and facilities 
• Better accounting for launch reimbursement 
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• Cross train the launch and processing crews 
• Less testing at launch bases 
• Provide emergency launch for manned spaceflight recovery 
 
Implemented in coordination with the Department of Space and the responsive culture, 
each of these changes will make space more responsive.  We will expand upon each of these 
changes in the Tier 2 section of the paper. 
C. DEVELOPMENT OF TIER 3 
From a Tier 3 perspective, our group began this quarter with an organization we created 
last quarter to encompass months-to-years ORS requirements: the Space Center of Excellence.  
We concluded last quarter that future space technology initiatives needed to be integrated into 
existing 2025 architectures, but that the current process of integration and technology insertion is 
essentially undefined and certainly not efficient.  We decided that the SCOE, the ORS office’s 
primary link to Tier 3, should act as a “gatekeeper” of new technology initiatives.  The SCOE 
would also have a close relationship with the other Tier offices or divisions within ORS, 
including the Launch Support Division and the Knowledge Center.  Thus, we had an 
organizational framework for the ORS office which included sub-organizations focused on 
specific temporal tiers, the SCOE’s being months-to-years. 
 We dove into this quarter’s project by expounding upon what we envisioned the SCOE 
should become, focusing more on the organizational aspects and constructs than its functions.  
We eventually realized a better approach would be to first refine those functions and work on the 
physical location, composition and disposition of the organization later.  Halfway through the 
new quarter, we also changed our focus from the SCOE office construct to Tier 3 functions.  
However, we began with an understanding that the SCOE needed to act as a gatekeeper for space 
technologies and should determine what programs were ORS specific.   
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 As we progressed, we realized that ORS is more of a culture or mindset rather than a 
specific program or office.  Still, our definition of the roles and functions of the SCOE continued 
to morph.  We decided that the SCOE should not act solely as a gatekeeper of ORS relevant 
space technologies, but that it should also actively seek out new responsive space technologies.  
We developed a Find, Filter and Forecast model to best describe the SCOE’s primary tasks.  We 
also came up with several options of how the SCOE should be modeled, looking to DARPA and 
NASA as examples.  We even considered specific locations within the continental US to locate 
the office. 
 The office would seek out and find new and relevant responsive space technologies.  It 
would act as a gatekeeper and filter out those technologies by creating and advocating responsive 
space compatibility standards.  Finally, the SCOE would attempt to forecast future responsive 
space technologies and direct newly discovered technologies not related to ORS to the correct 
office or agency.  Essentially, we bit off more than we could chew by trying to shepherd, with 
one small office or organization, the entire space community into developing ORS applicable 
programs and then attempting to develop the standards and requirements for what constituted 
operationally responsive space.  We began to realize the model of a small office taking on such 
large responsibilities did not seem very realistic.  
 As our group progressed with feedback from periodic project reviews, our initial 
approach seemed more and more improbable.  With the decision to move to a temporal focus 
rather than an office construct or model, our needs became clearer.  With the idea of the creation 
of a Department of Space and new assumptions for the 2025 timeframe, our vision for Tier 3 
became even more refined. 
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 Tier 3 within the Department of Space would focus on space plans and policy functions, 
acquisition functions and science and technology/research and development (S&T/R&D) 
functions, all allowing to more responsiveness within the National Security Space Enterprise.  
We chose not to pursue the office construct of the SCOE and did away with the name entirely.  
We determined that Tier 3 would not exist as simply another bureaucratic middleman but would 
serve as an enforcer of responsive-oriented strategic plans and policies, an integrator of current 
acquisition processes and future acquisition programs, as well as an enabler of current and future 
S&T/R&D initiatives.  To execute these tasks effectively would no longer require a large, 
heavily manned organization or office but would rather simply require the authority derived from 
the creation of a Department of Space. 
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II. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS 
 In order to properly assess each of our changes we have come up with a system to 
measure their effectiveness.  We are using the Measures of Effectiveness described by James 
Wertz in his paper presented at the responsive space conference in Los Angeles on 28 April 
2008.  The MoEs we used allowed us to give each course of action a measure of utility.  Our 
objective was to prioritize the MoEs by how useful they are to the warfighter and intelligence 
community.  It is hard to quantify intangible effects like risk, flexibility, level of preparedness 
and measure of utility, but we must do that to fully appreciate the effects of each change (Wertz 
14).  The MoEs that we used: 
• Responsiveness MoEs 
o Total response time- time from when a new request for data is made until the data 
is given to the user or requestor 
o Development time-total time to develop a needed technology 
• Goal oriented MoEs 
o Level of preparedness-level of readiness to react to world events 
o Measure of utility-ability to predict, protect, respond, retaliate, restore, rescue, 
contain or  limit collateral damage 
• Flexibility- ability to use the same asset for more than one mission, either at the same 
time or at a later time 
• Risk-probability of a successful deployment 
• Coverage-number of spacecraft required to achieve a given level of coverage or given 
frequency of observations 
• Cost-total cost 
These indicators affected our decision making process and ultimately helped us decide 
the changes that were most important.  Responsiveness is the perfect measure for our study, 
because it translates directly into our ultimate goal.  The other measures listed help quantify 
other effects that could bring responsiveness as well.  Cost itself is not an important measure, but 
with respect to providing more money, it can indirectly provide responsiveness.  For instance, if 
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we came up with a technology that allowed us to launch for a fraction of the traditional cost, we 
could provide more launches for the same total cost.   
Using Measures of Effectiveness allow us to quantify each change, and eliminate changes 
that do not result in responsiveness to the customer.  There are many changes that would 
arguable make space more efficient, less expensive or less risky, but if they did not ultimately 
improve responsiveness they were no longer considered.  MoEs provided a significant focusing 
function for our group to come to our conclusions. 
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III. DEPARTMENT OF SPACE 
 Early on we knew space needed a unified structure to be more responsive.  The decision 
we had to make was whether to unify the NSSE under a cabinet level organization or a service 
level organization within the DoD.  We decided space transcended the military structure with 
interests rising in business, travel and exploration.  We need to stand up a new cabinet level 
organization, the Department of Space.  Providing a unified command structure will allow us to 
shape the entire organization to be more responsive. 
The idea of centralizing command, control and authority of space assets is not a new one.  
It has the support of many independent organizations like the 2001 Space Commission and the 
Government Accounting Office (GAO) and is the topic of countless PME theses at all the 
various Service schools.  In the 2003 report titled Military Space Operations: Common Problems 
and Their Effects on Satellite and Related Acquisition, the GAO wrote of the troubled space 
acquisition process: 
“…there is a diverse array of organizations with competing interests involved in overall 
satellite development—from the individual military services, to testing organizations, 
contractors, civilian agencies, and in some cases international partners. This created 
challenges in making tough tradeoff decisions, particularly since, for many years; there 
was no high-level official within the Office of the Secretary of Defense dedicated to 
developing and enforcing an overall investment strategy for space.”   
 
 Creating the Department of Space assigns the responsibility for “developing and 
enforcing” an overall strategy as well as the responsibility for executing it.  We feel that a high-
level official within OSD is insufficient in that it still does not account for that diverse array of 
organizations outside the DoD. 
The creation of the Department of Space is at the heart of our solution to make 
government space more responsive to the customer.  This new Cabinet-level department would 
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be made up from the various space components of the military, intelligence community, NASA, 
Department of Commerce, and government-funded scientific endeavors.  This includes, but is 
not limited to, all Air Force, Navy, Army and Marine space elements (commands and 
headquarters), all of the NRO, the space components of NSA, NGA, DIA and the CIA, the space 
portions of NOAA, and NASA.  It will also encompass regulation of future commercial space 
ventures.  This takes the idea considered under Rumsfeld’s Space Commission report (to put the 
AF and NRO space assets under one authority – the USecAF) and does it one better.  The chart 
below depicts the roll-up into the Department of Space.  (The dotted line from “Commercial” 
indicates that the Department of Space only has regulatory authority over commercial space, we 
are not nationalizing the industry altogether.)   







Figure 2 Roll-up into Department of Space 
When deciding who to include in the Department of Space, it was almost easier to start 
with whole organizations and then decide which parts to cut out.  Specifically considered and 
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excluded from the Department of Space are ICBMs (should remain part of the Air Force), the 
aeronautics portion of NASA (we will give that to the Air Force), and the Missile Defense 
Agency.  While the Department of Space will launch and operate the satellites that are used for 
Missile Defense, the overall mission will remain with MDA.  Similarly, the Department of Space 
will provide services to the Intelligence Community (like signals and imagery) but the 
appropriate Intelligence agency will be responsible for the analysis and dissemination of these 
products.   
 As a service provider to the DoD and IC, the Department of Space will have a senior 
level board to consider, approve and prioritize the requirements of the customers.  The 
Department of Space will program funding based on the customer priorities.  The organization 
and process will be similar to the DoD’s Joint Capabilities Integration Development System 
(JCIDS) and Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC).  The JCIDS and JROC are in place 
to approve and prioritize requirements from the competing military services just as our process 
will prioritize between military, intelligence, and scientific customers.   
 The Department of Space will control the funding and budget authority commensurate 
with the levels held under the previous DoD, IC, or other government agency.  This combined 
requirements and funding process under a single authority will allow the Secretary of the 
Department of Space (SECSPACE) to make prioritization decisions across the entire space 
portfolio.  Currently, the various DoD Service Secretaries must make funding trade-offs between 
the many competing platforms in their service.  Satellites compete against planes in the Air Force 
and ships in the Navy.  At the DoD level, they then compete further against funding for tanks and 
helicopters and ground forces.  In a time like today, the ground wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are 
the immediate pressing need, and funding for satellite constellation replenishment and 
  16 
development take a back seat.  We are sacrificing our future to pay for our current programs and 
this short-sighted approach will no doubt come back to haunt us years down the road.  Under a 
Department of Space construct, on the other hand, the SECSPACE controls a dedicated space 
budget and can make tradeoffs within space to fund space.  System replenishment, future 
development, testing, scientific exploration, manned space flight will only compete against each 
other rather than all the other combined priorities of the DoD, IC, DoC and NASA.  Some years, 
constellation replenishment will be more critical than future development; other years we will 
want to increase funding to a manned space program that is ready to make giant leaps for 
mankind.  The important thing is that under Department of Space, a single authority will have the 
capability as well as the vision and insight to know how to prioritize those programs.   
 The other advantage of Department of Space is the centralized command and control over 
all space programs.  This is especially helpful when it comes to policy.  Implementing and 
enforcing policy decisions is impossible in the current organization of space.  Other than the 
President, no one person has control over all the U.S. space assets.  The President sets the 
national space priorities and policies, but Presidential directives do not get down to detailed 
levels.  That is normally left up to the Department-level.  In the case of space, there are too many 
disparate Departments, Agencies, and other organizations to coordinate and enforce any cross-
organizational policies.  We can rarely even get the Services in the DoD to agree to policies and 
priorities let alone also include the IC, NASA and others.   
 In the current environment, the DoD or NRO build and launch satellites to support their 
customers.  They try to accommodate the customers’ requirements and prioritize within their 
limited resources.  Often times, there are conflicting requirements within the DoD or IC among 
the many customers.  The Navy wants communication with wide coverage areas to bring 
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bandwidth to their ships, while the Army and Marines want concentrated beams to bring them 
more throughput for UAS feeds.  Some customers want as much throughput as the satellite can 
produce, while others (Special Forces) are willing to sacrifice bandwidth for protections like 
anti-jam, LPD/LPI (Low Probability of Detection/Low Probability of Intercept) and frequency 
hopping.  Meanwhile, in the IC, the various customer agencies fight for intelligence collections 
over their respective high-priority areas.  Decisions may need to go all the way to the SECDEF 
or DNI level to get resolved.  Management is best done at the lowest levels; a program can grind 
to a halt if waiting for a Secretary-level decision. 
 There is even less prioritization of requirements and resources external to DoD and DNI.  
Currently, there is no easy way to reduce funding from an Air Force program to plus-up an NRO 
program (or vice versa).  It would take Congressional action to take budget authority from one 
department and give it to another, and there would be untold bloodshed defending the dollars.  
Instead, a program in one organization may be delayed or cancelled while a “lesser” program in 
the other organization continues.  Within the Department of Space, there is oversight and access 
across all space programs and the ability to increase funding in any one at the cost of another.  
 The Department of Space organization (Fig. 3) is modeled after the DoD and then 
changes were made as appropriate.  We broke the Department up into three areas: the Secretariat, 
the Department of National Space Operations, and the Department of Space Exploration.   
  18 
 
Figure 3 Top Level Leadership of the Department of Space 
 
The Office of the Secretary of Space is composed of the Secretary of Space, the various 
Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries and their staffs (Fig. 4).  They are the headquarters 
leadership, responsible for the long-term planning, policies, organization and running of the 
Department.   
 
Figure 4 Secretariat of the Department of Space 
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The Department of National Space Operations (Fig. 5) is the part of the Department of 
Space that provides support to the military and intelligence communities.  The functionality 
previously found in places like Air Force Space Command and the NRO is now found here.  This 
organization is involved in responsiveness at all three Tier levels.  For example, the Space 
Operations division includes the day-to-day satellite operations and constellation management, 
as well as the consolidated operations centers for overall space situational awareness; all Tier 1 
functions.  The Launch Operations division includes the management of launch vehicles, 
facilities and personnel at all the federal launch sites; all Tier 2 functions.  The Strategic Plans 
and Policy Division ties in with the Secretariat and ensures close coordination of long term (Tier 
3) planning.  We will go into more detail about the divisions we have designated to a Tier 
function.  The divisions without color are important, but we did not develop these ideas enough 































Figure 5 Department of National Space Operations 
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The Department of Space Exploration (Fig. 6) regulates commercial space, supports civil 
space use, and is the provider of government-funded scientific space missions.  This is where the 
NASA space functionality now resides, among other things.  This organization has mostly Tier 3 
functionality because of the less urgent nature of scientific space.  Note the dotted line to the 
Launch Operations Division, which is in the Dept of National Space Ops, because the Dept of 
Space Exploration does not have its own Launch capabilities.  They rely on the Launch Ops from 
the Department of National Space Operations to support their scientific missions.  We gain 
efficiencies and experience by having one organization manage launch for the entire Department.        
 
Figure 6 Department of Space Exploration 
 
For the most part, personnel for the new Department of Space will come from existing 
space personnel in the organizations we will be drawing from.  Supporting organizations and 
staffs like finance, personnel, legal and the like will come from the “donating” organizations as 
well.  For example, if we cut 10% of the Air Force for the space experts, we will also take 10% 
  21 
of the people from the support organizations.  The biggest plus up will probably be at the 
Headquarters level.  Even though we will absorb the space-related HQ-personnel from the 
Services, Joint Staff, and IC, there is a lot of duplication needed at the higher levels.   
 In terms of real estate, the DoD currently spills out of the Pentagon into places like 
Crystal City and Rosslyn.  If we remove the space-related functions from the Pentagon, we can 
put non-space back into it like the Air Force International Affairs organization in Rosslyn and 
take over THEIR offices outside the Pentagon.  Other space-related organizations and ops 
centers currently on military bases (like the Air Force Space Command Building 1 on Peterson 
AFB and the various Space Operations Squadrons at Buckley and Schriever AFBs) will stay 
where they are as tenant organizations.  We will make financial and support agreements with the 
DoD to provide maintenance, power, facilities, etc.   
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IV.   ESTABLISHING AND DEVELOPING A CULTURE AND 
PHILOSOPHY 
In order to make improvements in any organization or individual, the end state must be 
well defined.  Improvements do not happen in a haphazard manner or on their own.  Specific 
steps must be taken to chart the course toward the desired goal for measurable improvement.  
There are three steps toward improvement:  1. List what is necessary and important and needs to 
improve.  2. Develop a philosophy.  3.  Set a direction with specific goals (Fuchs 1-7).  The 
Department of Space should follow these guidelines to establish and maintain an organizational 
culture of responsiveness. 
To improve responsiveness in the National Security Space Enterprise, it is important to 
have all personnel adopt a culture that promotes responsiveness.  The organization as a whole 
starts to be responsive when there is a common underlying identity of all personnel and each 
decides to be responsive in his personal outlook and actions.  “Organizational culture is a system 
of knowledge, of standards for perceiving, believing, evaluating and acting . . . that serve to 
relate human communities to their environmental settings” (Allaire 198).  The Department of 
Space must assimilate all the varied and disparate sub-cultures that exist currently within the 
NSSE in order for all personnel to embrace and share this improved overarching idea of 
responsive support to the United States. 
The leaders’ cultural messages should address ambiguities that are beyond the scope of 
any organizational subculture to explain to employees.  Top management must consistently make 
highly visible business and personnel decisions that reinforce the organizational ideologies, 
values and norms for success. Cultural change then relies on leaders' communication techniques 
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that cross subcultural boundaries and carry messages about ideologies, values and norms that can 
be internalized by all employees (Organizational Culture). 
First, the overall mission of the Department must be known and understood by all 
personnel working in or with the Space community.  The mission must be the motivator that 
each person contributes their efforts to the benefit and defense of the entire nation.  This 
foundation in patriotic service will support the population at large as well as those serving in the 
armed forces, intelligence community, business and science. 
A. MISSION 
The Department of Space shall provide space-based capabilities for national defense, 
information, communication, trade and exploration. 
B. STRATEGIC VISION 
Key leaders across all levels of the Department of Space are responsible for the Strategic 
Vision of the entire organization.  These principles should be discussed and understood across 
the departments, divisions and components that make up the Department.  All personnel need to 
recognize what the vision of the whole organization is and how it relates to the overall mission, 
their department or office and in the daily conduct of their duties.  This common identity with 
common vision establishes the culture required across the organization.  The following is our 
group’s vision for the Department of Space: 
Responsiveness — Lead, manage and coordinate the national response to space-based 
needs for national defense, information, communication, trade and exploration during routine & 
crisis actions 
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Organizational Excellence — Create a culture that promotes responsiveness with a 
common identity, innovation, accountability and teamwork to achieve efficiencies and 
effectiveness 
Awareness — Identify and understand threats, assess vulnerabilities, determine potential 
impacts and disseminate timely information to the intelligence community, military and space 
communities and the American public 
Prevention — Detect, deter and mitigate threats to the United States space infrastructure 
Protection — Safeguard our critical national space infrastructure from acts of war, 
terrorism, natural effects, or other emergencies 
Service — Serve the public effectively by facilitating communications, lawful trade, 
travel and scientific exploration 
C. EDUCATION PROCESS 
The education process for instilling the Strategic Vision, based on the Mission is essential 
to the establishment of a responsive organizational culture.  This is done initially through the 
recruiting process and entry level training, retention of trained and indoctrinated personnel, 
promotion of qualified members within the organization and regular sustainment. 
Recruit and Retain 
When brining new personnel into the Department of Space, the human resource 
personnel must screen based on qualifications and receptiveness to the culture.  Applicants who 
cannot apply the foundations of the Vision or who demonstrate resistance to the necessary level 
of service and support to the many customers of the Department are unsuitable to the 
organization’s overall responsiveness.  Personnel who adopted and demonstrate responsive 
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actions, thoughts and plans should be retained and rewarded for the positive attitude.  Retention 
bonuses and rewards will be a function of the management at every level and the manpower 
management within the Secretariat. 
Entry Level Training 
Personnel joining any organization within the Department of Space require training in 
their specific tasks and in the overall philosophy, vision and culture.  This entry level training 
will be necessary and the responsibility of the hiring human resources office.  The cultural 
indoctrination should encompass the many facets of the Department of Space and introduce the 
new member of their organization’s storied history, rites, ceremonies, language and symbols 
(Organizational Culture).  
Sustainment 
When meeting other members or leaders of the organization, it is important for the newly 
joined to have the culture modeled by key leaders as well peers.  This sustainment is important to 
the perpetuation of the vision by making it a part of the organization’s daily life.  Additionally, 
the observance of ceremonies like the anniversary of the first launch of Sputnik, an artificial 
satellite, in October, human space travel with “Yuri’s Day” in April and the Apollo 11 mission 
landing on the moon in July would be appropriate for the Department of Space.  Of course, a 
ceremony and celebration of the creation of the Department of Space would be mandatory! 
Advancement 
The culture of responsiveness will also be sustained and reinforced when the talented and 
deserving personnel who demonstrate this attitude and live the culture are advanced within the 
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organization.  By keeping talent and corporate knowledge of the culture in house, the culture will 
continue to develop from within according to the leadership’s Mission and Strategic Vision. 
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V. TIER 1 
In the context of making space operationally responsive, a Tier 1 response in the time 
frame of minutes to days is arguably the most important.  Further adding to that rational is the 
repeated comments in reports like the recent GAO report on ORS stating that “senior military 
commanders have reported shortfalls in tactical space capabilities in each recent major conflict 
over the past decade” (Space Acquisitions 2).  Since the speed of information transfer has rapidly 
advanced, even in just the last few years, it can be implied that the term tactical is dealing with 
time-critical situations.  The combination of terrestrial systems like advanced data-links and 
space-based capabilities have shown the warfighter what the potential is, but the mainly strategic 
satellites can sometimes create bottlenecks in the flow of information.   
An uninformed user might envision small satellites that can be launched rapidly and 
tasked immediately to provide necessary information to the warfighter.  In fact, this is a common 
misconception that has been challenged by many involved in the space community and 
acquisition.  Dr. Ed Tomme, a retired Air Force officer, gave a presentation in May 2007 at the 
Naval Postgraduate School in which he showed some of the flaws in the myth of TacSat.  In his 
presentation, he assumed that you could achieve a rapid launch capability and build payloads for 
less than 20 million dollars.  The flaw, he opined, was that placing a small satellite into a LEO 
orbit still resulted in short passes, very few passes per day, and large gaps between passes 
(Tomme 22).  In general, the services needed by battlefield commanders can be supported by 
terrestrial assets and a space-based response may not be feasible based on cost or physics. 
 If rapid launch and small payloads are not the single answer to making space 
operationally responsive, then what is?  Examining this question in the context of the new 
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Department of Space, some immediate possibilities present themselves.  Leveraging the unified 
command, common operating vision, and clear lines of command, there is greater potential for 
rapid information flow and more efficient management of resources.  That leverage, and 
ensuring the benefits are passed down to the warfighter, is the most effective way of improving 
responsiveness in a Tier 1 timeframe. 
 More concrete examples of that responsiveness can be found in the organization and 
command structure of the Department of National Space.  Protection of on-orbit assets, including 
surveillance of space, provides what is arguably the most important element of responsiveness.  
Under the Space Operations Directorate the Command Center and Operations Center concept 
provides major advantages from the tasking of satellites to the dissemination of collected data.  
The Operational Plans and Training Directorate provides much needed training to both satellite 
operators and users so that they can operate in the challenging environments of the future. 
A. THE SPACE OPERATIONS COMMAND CENTER 
The Space Operations Command Center (SpOCC) will be key to making Space 
Operations more responsive.  Our recommended SpOCC architecture leverages the current 
capabilities and capacity.  The SpOCC proposal will utilize existing infrastructure and eliminate 
undesired redundancies to the greatest extent possible.  From our study it is clear that developing 
the SpOCC will not see large savings in appropriated dollars, but should not require an increased 
budget commitment.  In drafting our recommendation for the SpOCC we asked, “How is the way 
we are doing things now unresponsive, and how will the SpOCC in 2025 be more responsive?”  
We also asked, “What needs to be responsive in minutes to days?” 
  Our current space architecture has many operation and product tasking centers located at 
various locations.  The Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC), located at Vandenberg Air Force 
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Base, is responsible for United States Global Space Force tasking.  When JSpOC was stood up, it 
was intended to be the hub for US space control, maintaining space situational awareness and 
operational awareness of all United States Government constellations.  However, the JSpOC was 
never manned up, or given the authority to be effective.  The JSpOC is not a true command 
center.  The information being briefed to JFCC Space is not real-time, or even near-real-time.  
JSpOC situational and operational awareness resides in a power point presentation that is 
presented once per day.  So, how is JSpOC now?  Is it operationally responsive?  No.  The 
JSpOC is not near-real-time, and is not operationally responsive. 
  In addition to the JSpOC, there are a number of other operation centers monitoring 
various aspects of our on orbit constellations.  The NRO Operations Center monitors the NRO 
constellations, but tasking and processing of NRO products are performed at other command 
centers, spread throughout the country.  The global positioning system (GPS) command center is 
located in Denver, Colorado, and does not directly provide real time constellation updates to the 
JSpOC.  The US Navy operates its communications satellites from Pt Magu, California.  This 
fractured command structure leads to problems with large-scale, high-level decision making, and 
is effectively unresponsive. 
  When commanders in the field lose capacity or capability there is not a single process or 
authority to restore, or bridge, lost capability.  Currently, there is no standard operating 
procedure or pre-planned response that the deployed units can follow to regain capacity.  
Additionally, there is not currently a standard approach to acquire additional capacity when cued 
that a situation is developing. 
  32 
   Our SpOCC needs to be able to achieve the following three Tier 1 capabilities, in order to 
meet Tier 1 time requirements.  Tier 1 is defined as an immediate response and the SpOCC must 
be able to, in minutes to days: 
• Begin Reposition of On-Orbit Assets 
• Deploy Appropriate Terrestrial Assets to Augment Lost Capability 
• Leverage Commercial Satellites 
 
  We also need to take the following into consideration, because these points will impact 
the way we do business: 
• Tier 1 responses may not be able to completely fill the capabilities gap 
• Operations must be able to continue without some space assets 
• Training and plans should be certified by the Department of Space Operations 
Directorate 
 
  Because we know that our adversaries will do their best to deny us the operating 
environment we have perfected since DESERT STORM, the warfighter must train in a denied 
environment.  Thus the SpOCC needs to be able to have plans in place that fills gaps taken away 
by adversaries. 
 The third specification is to maintain space operational and situational awareness. To 
make the SpOCC more responsive than our legacy architectures we need: 
• Operational Awareness 
o Need a single source of information on all space based assets 
o Track health/welfare of all buses and payloads 
• Situational Awareness 
o Need a single source of information on all space based threats 
o Should include space weather, ASAT, and predictive analysis 
• Desired effect of combined OA and SA is ability to predict rather than react 
 
  To be more responsive than our legacy architecture we propose establishing a SpOCC.  
The Department of National Space Operations SpOCC will be similar to the existing JSPOC, in 
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that it will adapt the operations center that is currently located at Vandenberg, California.  Figure 
7 provides a depiction of the high level view of the SpOCC. 
 
Figure 7 Space Operations Command Center 
 
The SpOCC will provide the focus point for the Department of Space Tier 1 response.  
The SpOCC provides the highest level of approval authority in order to meet Tier 1 time 
requirements.  Much of SpOCC response capability and capacity is laid on the foundation of 
awareness, both situational and operational.  The SpOCC is the first place customers in the 
community call to report, request or task Tier 1 assistance. 
  Reporting directly to the SpOCC is the Space Situational Awareness (SSA) Division. 
SSA is the near-real-time answer to current and predicted events in orbit that will affect our 
constellations.  Having the SSA function collated in the SpOCC will reduce time in the event 
action is required, either defensively or offensively. 
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  Also reporting to the SpOCC are all of the subordinate Operations Centers (OPS).  From 
Figure 7, it can be seen that the individual OPS Centers, OPS 1, OPS 2, OPS 3, etc, all report 
directly to the SpOCC.  The goal of the individual OPS is to command by negation their portion 
of the overall space system.  For instance, all of the individual constellations that are currently 
operated out of Vandenberg Air Force Base will be centralized, such that a single OPS Director 
will be responsible to the SpOCC for all activities at that site.  This consolidation will eliminate 
redundancy, create efficiency, and provide better overall situational and operational awareness. 
 
Figure 8 SpOCC Floor 
 
Figure 8 provides the functional layout of the SpOCC.  The SpOCC is connected to the 
global information grid.  This transparency provides real time situational and operational 
awareness to and from the customers.  It also provides near real time communications of 
requirements and requirement solutions to and from the SpOCC and the customers.  In the 
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SpOCC are subject matter experts (SME) for all of the areas that are required to make space 
products available to customers internally and externally to the SpOCC. 
 Some of the SMEs represent the IMINT, SIGINT, COMINT product lines.  Also 
represented are SMEs for SSA, OCS/DCS, and intelligence, as it relates to space.  Additionally, 
experts on space weather and precision, timing and navigation are situated on the floor. 
  The commercial SME has visibility on all on orbit space assets that are being utilized via 
contract, or can be leveraged to provide capability or capacity to the department of space.  He or 
she would have direct access to a contracting officer so that commercial products or capacity can 
be obtained if required. 
  The non-space SME has visibility of non-space assets/solutions that may be located in 
specific theatres, or could be deployed to provide non-space solutions to requests.  In our 
assumptions it was stated that most theater ISR would come from non-space assets, thus the non-
space assets will be significant. 
  The tasking SME has a big picture view of what resources are available to be tasked.  
Because the SpOCC has situational and operational transparency the tasking SME, knows what 
individual OPS Centers are available for tasking.  This tasking will become critical when product 
providers are experiencing technical difficulties, or when significant tasking loads are present. 
  The national database (NDB) SME has complete visibility on the individual databases 
that contain Commercial and National SIGINT, ELINT and IMINT databases.  This SME will 
not maintain the databases, but with automation can quickly determine if the databases have a 
product solution that would allow an immediate response, saving time, money and resources.  An 
example of product solutions for IMINT could be providing a lower resolution commercial 
product that is in the commercial database, rather than scheduling a national system. 
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   The Fusion Cell SME serves to provide a coordinated response, for situations that do not 
have an available PPR.  The fusion cell will be composed of SpOCC SMEs that will work 
together to solve an emergent requirement.  The fusion cell can be viewed as a tiger team similar 
to the Tier 3 technical response that is being proposed to solve emergent technical requirements.  
He or she works directly for the Director and has a high visibility of the situational and 
operational awareness being maintained by the SpOCC, and the current required tasking.  He and 
his team will work to quickly develop critical tasking requirements that do not need PPRs, so 
that the Director can make a time sensitive decision. 
 The SpOCC OPS Director is the senior person on watch and is a Flag or SES equivalent.  
The Director is the voice of the SpOCC, reporting directly to the Deputy for Space Operations.  
For the most part his role is of a supervisory nature.  All SMEs and OPS Centers have command 
by negation and shall follow PPRs as required.  Where situations are presented that have not 
been considered or planned for, the Fusion Cell SME will provide recommendations to the 
Director, who will approve or disapprove as appropriate.  The Director will directly 
communicate with the IC, Government and DoD customers whenever the situation requires. 
  Reporting directly to the SpOCC are the individual OPS Centers.  As mentioned 
previously, these centers are the result of on site consolidation of the various space ground 
command and control centers that are spread through out the globe.  See Figure 9 for an example 
OPS Center. 
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Figure 9 Example Operations Center 
 
The individual OPS Centers will have similar structures, but allow for specification as 
required.  In this example each OPS Center has a Director responsible for all space operations 
being conducted at the site. 
Each OPS Center will have managers responsible for each individual constellation.  For 
instance, Colorado Springs would have managers for the DSP and GPS constellations, each 
responsible for all aspects of their constellations. 
Each Ops Center would also have an Intel, OCS, DCS SME responsible to the Director 
for the on orbit safety of the constellations.  With good intelligence and well thought out pre-
planned-responses, on-orbit risks can be eliminated, reduced or mitigated. 
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Each Ops Center will also have a Data Base Manager, who is responsible for the 
individual constellations products being added to the specific data bases, minimizing delays and 
duplication. 
This proposed architecture would reduce redundancy, decrease response time and make 
the Department of Space much more responsive.  Much of the capability presented in the SpOCC 
is present in our legacy architecture, but it is not open.  Many of the legacy capabilities that will 
be incorporated into the SpOCC are stove piped.  The SpOCC will knock down the stovepipes, 
making the overall system more capable and responsive. Measures of Effectiveness for the 
SpOCC: 
• response time from time capability is lost to time capability is restored 
• response time from time it is recognized that additional capacity will be required to 
time additional capacity is available 
• the latency of situational and operational awareness 
• the transparency of Tier 1 requirements between the customers and the SpOCC 
• the transparency of the NDB and the ability to provide products from existing 
database to customers, when it is not feasible to use space-based systems to obtain 
requested products. 
 
B. SPACE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS 
Protecting our space assets depends on three important operations divisions:  Space 
Situational Awareness, Offensive-Counter Space and Defensive Counter Space.  Each of these 
divisions has data pathways to other government agencies and commercial companies that work 
in space.  The Space Situational Awareness division has particular connections throughout the 
intelligence agencies.  They also have data flow from every ground station around the globe.  
The Counter Space divisions have close ties with those in the science and technology arm of the 
Department of Space.  These connections with S&T will aid both counter space missions and 
provide the visibility of DCS/OCS requirements.  
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Space Situational Awareness is the cornerstone to keeping everything that we have in 
orbit safe from hostile action and the hostile environment in which they exist.  Every SSA 
division throughout the Department of National Space Operations has a strong interaction with 
each satellite program.  This Operational Awareness gives the Operations Director at the separate 
locations the health and welfare of their satellite or constellation.   The SSA division has data 
flow with other government and non-government agencies to help those who need to know the 
health and welfare of particular satellites.  SSA division provides its critical information to the 
Space Operations Command Center, who keeps the customers apprised of the overall operational 
picture of the national satellites.   
Space Situational Awareness in each individual location is not necessarily planned as an 
entire office manned by a team of experts, but may be done by select individuals as a collateral 
duty.  This job could be done in conjunction with an operational awareness job done at that 
location.  All the data collected at the separate location will feed back to the SpOCC for the 
larger SSA division to process and review.  The SSA at the SpOCC will be manned as a 24/7 job 
by at least one person per shift.  The SSA can help the Director of the SpOCC make larger 
decisions for all of Department of Space. 
Every ground station that the Department of Space can obtain information from will help 
feed the overall SSA for the SpOCC.  Every ground station will be configured to communicate 
with every satellite.  These ground stations are critical to the next step within the Space 
Operations Directorate, which is Offensive and Defensive Counter Space. 
Offensive and Defensive Counter Space 
 Offensive Counter Space quickly gets classified to very high levels but on the conceptual 
side of things, there are a multitude of things that we can put in space to give us an offensive 
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capability.  A short list of options includes anti-satellite weapons, maneuvering satellites, 
projectile and energy weapons.  Each of these can be from both space or ground facilities.  
Maneuvering satellites could be small cubesat-sized craft which attach themselves onto other 
enemy satellites to push them out of orbit.  They could possibly de-orbit them for reentry to 
earth’s atmosphere or super-synch them into a non-recoverable orbit.  The projectile or kinetic 
means of attacking a satellite would be the capability of destroying spacecraft or degrading their 
ability to perform their missions.  An example would be the shooting of a missile that would ram 
headlong into the enemy object either in orbit or in the upper stages of flight to orbit.  Energy 
weapons could flood an enemy satellite with over-powering radio frequencies or some form of 
radiation that causes massive system failures (David). 
 The physics involved in accomplishing these offensive tactics is complicated and 
currently very difficult to accomplish.  The Offensive Counter Space works hand-in-hand with 
the Defensive Counter Space division, because if one division thinks of an idea then the other 
needs to know how to defeat it.  Cooperation between these fields will develop new and 
innovative techniques that will benefit and better protect US space assets. 
Defensive Counter Space has its traditional role of protecting United States assets from 
space, but the Department of Space will also incorporate using terrestrial means of protecting 
space assets.  This terrestrial focus helps the Defensive Counter Space division keep focus on an 
enemy’s ability to attack our satellites from the ground with directed energy weapons or anti-
satellite weapons.  Defensive Counter Space, under the Department of Space, has the ability to 
employ other governmental agencies and services to help stop attacks against our satellites.  The 
Defensive Counter Space department would report up the chain of command to activate 
additional options, like the exercise of political means via the Department of State, before any 
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kinetic retaliation would be taken for attacks against our satellites.  This avenue would be first in 
the line of protecting our satellites from ground-based attacks.   
The Intelligence Community assets, in conjunction with the Department of Space 
Defensive Counter Space division, will monitor the possible threats to our space assets.  Both 
will be vigilant in watching worldwide for possible anti-satellite arms build-up or other 
indicators for any possible attack.  With these indicators the Department of Space could again 
use diplomatic means through the Department of State or other non-military organizations to put 
a non-kinetic stop to the build-up or other more peaceful courses of action.  If these efforts fail to 
prevent actual war in space, the Department of Space Defensive Counter Space would be ready 
to defend our space assets to their fullest.    
Space Situational Awareness, Offensive and Defensive Counter Space are intertwined 
throughout the Satellite Operations Directorate, within the Department of Space and other 
external agencies within the Federal government.  The data flow that each brings into the Space 
Operations Command Center during day-to-day operations and crisis action is vital for helping 
the Director of the SpOCC and the leaders of the Department of Space make critical decisions. 
Dr. Wertz’s examples of goal-oriented measures of effectiveness are what the SSA 
division is using.   For the SSA division, a great measure of utility or effectiveness is the level of 
responsiveness that the SSA division gives to the different OPS Centers, encompassing every 
level of the Satellite Operations Department.  This is a tangible item, which could be measured 
via training jackets of the individual operators along with showing the trainers their level of 
responsiveness during exercises.  Besides the trainers, leaders at all levels from the Director of 
Satellite Operations up through the SECSPACE could also see this quantifiable responsiveness.  
Harder to quantify, responsiveness could also be measured by the ability that the SSA division 
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has to predict unfolding events.  This gains the Department of Space time to respond, protect, 
retaliate and restore (Wertz “ORS Mission Utility” 10).  
 A few measures of effectiveness for the Counter-Space division are the ability to respond, 
to protect, to retaliate either kinetically or non-kinetically, and limiting collateral damage to our 
own space assets.  If the SpOCC can detect and possibly prevent an attack with SSA, then the 
OCS/DCS divisions could either respond to protect or retaliate with our satellites or ground 
stations.  All of these tools, working in concert, towards the common goal of limiting collateral 
damage from enemy action and US response. 
Training 
Many of the crises discussed in the context of Operationally Responsive Space refer to a 
“Space Pearl Harbor” where U.S. Defensive Counter-Space capabilities are either caught off 
guard or overwhelmed.  The result is that we are left with a crippled space force where our 
ability to communicate, navigate, and perform ISR is limited.  This is the worst case scenario and 
one that is frequently used as justification for funding research into quick assembly, rapid launch, 
and other associated technologies.  While the merits of that response are discussed in this paper 
and countless other publications and reports, there is a separate and equally important aspect to 
this issue.  In the hours following such a hypothetical attack, the warfighters must continue to 
execute their mission to the best of their ability while the various groups that support them will 
have to rapidly respond. 
 To prepare for that response in advance, both the warfighter and those that provided the 
support must be adequately trained.  If preventing an attack or loss of capability is the most 
responsive option we have, planning to operate in a denied environment and beginning the 
process of recovering is the next iteration.  Training lessens the severity of the losses of space 
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assets and thus diminishes the impact it has on our ability to prosecute a war.  Navy squadrons 
use the phrase “GPS cripple” to describe individuals who have become so dependent on their 
satellite based navigation systems that they almost can not function without them.  This mindset 
needs to be replaced with a completely different one.  Air, land and sea-based units should 
prepare to navigate without GPS or with reduced accuracy and coverage.  They should utilize 
alternate communications methods besides satellite, and their weapons and tactics training 
should incorporate similar means.  Space-based technology has greatly increased the lethality of 
the warfighter, but we do not want to provide a single-point of failure for our enemy, that leaves 
us with no other options. 
Similarly, the various operations and support groups that provide these services need to 
prepare for catastrophic losses of their space based assets.  The ways those satellite vehicles or 
communications networks could be lost are varied and situational dependent, but regardless, 
there should be a plan in place in case they are taken offline.  The Department of Space is in a 
unique position in that it can standardize training across the spectrum of satellite and space 
operations.  Standard training plans can be implemented and trained to for scenarios that include 
losses due to enemy action and the space environment.  A single loss or the destruction of large 
parts of a constellation can be trained to.  Finally, large exercises can be conducted that 
encompass many parts of space control, operations and support so that readiness can be tested 
and assessed in the most realistic situations possible.  All of this training should have the 
eventual goal of reducing the time to respond to a catastrophic loss. 
The Director of Operational Plans and Training, whom is subordinate to the Director of 
National Space Operations, oversees the training and certification of satellite operators and users 
in regards to their utilization of space resources.  The Operational Plans and Training department 
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is further sub-divided into two sections.  The Satellite Operator Training section handles 
operational plans for the satellite operators.  They help to standardize and codify operations and 
share lessons-learned throughout the department.  One of their specific charters is to develop a 
spectrum of operational responses that can deal with everything from the loss of a single satellite 
to the loss of multiple satellites in multiple constellations. 
Those response plans are vital for responding to threats that could affect the satellites 
within the Department of Space organization.  They are the satellite operations that are critical to 
national security.  The space operations section runs the Space Situational Awareness network 
and also conducts satellite operations.  The satellites run in those two sections provide almost all 
of the information products required by the warfighter.  They provide many services, like 
communications and Position, Navigation and Timing which are deemed indispensable in 
today’s day and age.  Because of their importance, the satellite operators should train at many 
levels including individual satellites, constellations and multiple constellations. 
Individual satellite operators should be trained for an immediate response to either threats 
to their satellite or threats to their constellation.  Those threats could come in the form of 
conjunctions with space debris, the onerous space environment, or deliberate attacks.  The 
deliberate attacks themselves could be manifested in several forms including kinetic attacks, 
deception and denial attacks, or network attacks on ground stations to name a few.  To 
adequately train a single operator you will need to augment their initial training with yearly 
training and certification.  The intent of certification would be to show that individual operators 
are adequately prepared and have the necessary resources to respond immediately to these 
threats.  Inherent in that immediate response is the information necessary to recognize an attack 
which was previously discussed in the Space Situational Awareness section. 
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At the constellation level, the entire team should be prepared to handle similar threats as 
was discussed at the individual unit level.  Also, the constellation training will build upon the 
training and certification and training done at the individual level.  Constellations will need to 
demonstrate that the majority of their operators meet Tier 1 certification levels for the entire 
constellation to be deemed Tier 1 compliant.  Training and documentation should be examined 
for the entire constellation to ensure that their operational plans are in place and up-to-date.  
Coordination with Space intelligence and Counter-Space representatives should be done to 
ensure that those plans are adequate for the changing technology and threats presented by 
adversarial nation states and rogue operators.  Finally, a coordinated exercise should be 
accomplished on a yearly basis demonstrating proficiency in maintaining continuity during the 
loss of varying portions of a satellite constellation.  The exercise should examine the reporting of 
losses to the Space Operations Command Center, notification of affected users, response times, 
and utilization of other space and terrestrial assets to augment capabilities. 
Finally, training can be implemented across multiple constellations to examine the result 
of a large-scale, coordinated assault on our space network and assets.  First, this is something 
that would be virtually impossible to coordinate without the new organizational structure of the 
Department of Space.  Conducted on a semiannual basis, this training exercise would stress the 
system and expose flaws and errors in many areas.  However, exposing those issues prior to an 
actual occurrence is of great importance, and the lessons learned could also potentially improve 
coordinated efforts between multiple constellations on a more regular basis.   
It is important to look at the scope required and the necessary methods for training all of 
these operators.  Examining just the 14th Air Force which manages a large portion of the United 
States’ space assets can give perspective on the requirements necessary (see Table 1).  First, you 
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can note the large number of organizations and their supporting staff.  It is unlikely that large 
portions of the functions those organizations provide will be able to be consolidated during the 
reorganization into the Department of Space.  An examination of FY 2009 estimates for Air 
Force spending on training and education shows they expect to spend $2.9 billion dollars total.  
(Department of the Air Force 20-31)  However, those numbers contain only $420.6 million 
dollars budgeted for Specialized Skill Training and that money is mainly apportioned to specific 
training subsets that do not include dedicated space training.  The largest dollar amount set aside 
for space training is $4.0 million for Space Professional Development.  Most of these 
organizations will have a portion of their Operation and Maintenance (O&M) budget for training.  
Traditionally, that dollar amount is small when compared to overall O&M expenditures, and 
accordingly, the Operational Plans and Training Directorate will not have a large budget with 
which to operate. 
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  21st Space Wing – Space Control 
   SPACE WARNING SQUADRONS  
  6th Space Warning Squadron - Cape Cod AFS, Mass.  
  7th Space Warning Squadron - Beale AFB, Calif.  
  10th Space Warning Squadron - Cavalier AFS, N.D.  
  12th Space Warning Squadron - Thule AB, Greenland  
  13th Space Warning Squadron - Clear AFS, Alaska  
  Royal Air Force Fylingdales - United Kingdom 
SPACE CONTROL SQUADRONS  
  4th Space Control Squadron - Holloman AFB, N.M.  
  Det 1, 21st Operations Group  - White Sands, N.M.  
  Det 2, 21st Operations Group - Diego Garcia  
  Det 3, 21st Operations Group - Hickam AFB, Hawaii  
  Det 4, 21st Operations Group - Moron AB, Spain  
  16th Space Control Squadron - Peterson AFB, Colo.  
  20th Space Control Squadron - Eglin AFB, Fla.  
  20th Space Control Squadron, Det. 1  - Dahlgren, Va.  
  76th Space Control Squadron - Peterson AFB, Colo. 
  30th Space Wing – Launch (Vandenberg) 
   30th OPERATIONS GROUP 
  Operations Support Squadron  
  Space Communications Squadron  
  2nd Range Operations Squadron  
  Range Management Squadron  
  Weather Squadron 
   30th LAUNCH GROUP 
      Launch Support Squadron  
  1st Air and Space Test Squadron  
  4th Space Launch Squadron  
  45th Space Wing – Launch (Cape Canaveral) 
   45th OPERATIONS GROUP 
      1st Range Operations Squadron 
      Antigua Air Station (Det. 1, 45 OG) 
      Ascension Aux. Air Field (Det. 2, 45 OG) 
      Operations Support Squadron 
      Range Management Squadron 
      Space Communications Squadron 
      Weather Squadron  
   45th LAUNCH GROUP 
      45th Launch Support Squadron  
  1st Space Launch Squadron  
  5th Space Launch Squadron  
 
Table 1a.  Air Force Space Command – 14th Air Force 
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  50th Space Wing – Satellite Operations and Communication 
   50th OPERATIONS GROUP 
      1st Space Operations Squadron 
      2nd Space Operations Squadron  
      3rd Space Operations Squadron 
      4th Space Operations Squadron 
      50th Operations Support Squadron 
   50th NETWORK OPERATIONS GROUP 
      50th Space Communications Squadron 
      21st Space Operations Squadron 
      22nd Space Operations Squadron 
      23rd Space Operations Squadron 
  460th Space Wing – ISR and Missile Warning 
   ADF – Buckley AFB 
 
Table 1b. Air Force Space Command – 14th Air Force (concluded) 
 
If training and certification for individuals and constellations will occur on a yearly basis, 
there will need to be innovative methods employed to ensure quality training while operating 
with a potentially constrained budget.  The Satellite Operator Training division of the 
Operational Plans and Training Directorate will provide training through on-site assist visits and 
through delivery of training via electronic means.  On-site assists, while more costly in terms of 
man hours and training dollars, are still important to establish important training criteria and 
critically evaluate the personnel operating our satellites.  Delivering training via electronic means 
provides flexibility and can sometimes be more cost-effective way to train large numbers of 
disparate organizations. 
Certification teams that travel to each organization to conduct training and certify these 
units will have some very specific requirements and goals.  First, the training teams should be 
made up of individuals with a minimum of three years experience in satellite operations and 
should be headed by an individual who has more experience than that and preferably has 
operational experience with more than one constellation.  To assess a single constellation, a team 
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of at least three individuals given a week should be able to accommodate a fairly thorough 
examination of the unit.  Pre-work should be completed prior to the on-site training to maximize 
the time where the evaluators are examining the personnel and getting to assess their abilities 
while watching them actually perform their job.  Training teams ideally would be able to spend a 
three to four week period in a geographic location so that they could maximize time on site with 
minimal travel time.  Potentially the time on-site could be shortened by utilizing weekends since 
satellite operations are continuous.  If training teams are afforded a ratio of twice the amount of 
time home compared to how long they are gone, then the total number of teams can be calculated 
based on how many Operation Centers they need to visit. 
The electronic means for delivering training are varied and can be tailored to specific 
organizations.  Most organizations can utilize standardized web-based training for basic 
operations.  Tied to a common database, progress can be tracked and basic readiness can be 
assessed with little work by the Satellite Operator Training division.  While this training has 
some effectiveness, greater utility can be provided by a virtual collaborative environment.  
Creating an environment that allows for communication, free-flow of ideas, and a sense of 
community within the satellite operators is essential to creating truly useful training.  This 
concept could be expanded to tools that emulate the consoles of the operators and the 
constellations themselves.  This virtual collaborative environment would be similar to a 
simulator because tactics and techniques could be tested in extremis with no potential harm to 
real systems, but it would incorporate users across the spectrum.  Other advantages would be 
recording of chat logs for data mining and the ability to connect users without additional TAD 
costs.  Combining satellite analysis tools like STKTM and massive multiplayer video games to 
build scenarios and realistic visuals would provide a cost-effective and very productive medium 
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for learning.  Once consider the bane of education, these video game approaches are now in 
widespread use and even have texts, like Marc Prensky’s Digital Game-Based Learning that 
present a comprehensive description of the methodology.  If they were robust enough, these 
environments could even be used to facilitate the large-scale, semiannual exercises. 
Many of these techniques for training and learning can be applied to the other set of 
trainees, the users of satellite services and products.  The men and women of all the services at 
almost every level utilize some sort of satellite.  In particular, the units at the “tip of the spear” 
are heavily dependent on satellites for navigation, communication, and employing their weapons.  
If asked to categorize their dependence on those systems, most operators would say they are 
highly reliant on them.  As information is pushed at a faster pace and more traditional skills are 
automated to allow the warfighter to instead process that information, the skill sets of past 
warriors have eroded.  Unfortunately, this exposes a glaring weakness that would be completely 
exposed by a loss of some of the more critical satellites.   
The Satellite User Training division of the Operational Plans and Training Directorate is 
responsible for overseeing the training of the warfighter in regards to operating with and without 
satellite capabilities.  While training is already conducted on how to utilize the systems, training 
for how to cope without them or how to operate in a denied environment is not as common.  For 
example, Commanders are hesitant to conduct exercises where strict Emissions Control 
(EMCON) is enforced or GPS for navigation is secured because of safety issues.  However, if 
they were ever required to conduct operations in a crisis or war under those same circumstances, 
they would find themselves and their troops woefully unprepared.  Thus, the key is to practice 
under those conditions during peace time where the only injuries should hopefully be bruised 
egos, and the lessons learned can be disseminated throughout the services.  
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Again, this training will require a two-pronged attack.  Similar to the satellite operator 
training, there should be person-to-person training combined with education.  The person-to-
person training should come in the form of individuals sent to major training exercises.  They 
should have a foundation in DCS, an understanding of the threats, and the ability to influence 
planning for these exercises.  In essence, they need to be able to ensure that realistic training 
scenarios are incorporated into already existing exercises so that the soldiers in the field have to 
learn to live without all of the space-based services they have come to expect for some period of 
time.  A single advisor utilized for major exercises that incorporate multiple units would provide 
a large benefit to many organizations, with minimal manpower requirements.  In addition, they 
need to learn how to ascertain satellite status through the existing Operational Awareness 
networks.  They should have a plan in place to augment capability with terrestrial assets since 
there will be an inherent lag of unspecified time before all of the previous capabilities will be 
restored.  For instance, High-Altitude, Long Loiter airships could provide an ad-hoc network for 
pushing data from command posts to troops in the field beyond line-of-sight.  Also, utilizing 
alternative technology for navigation or weapons employment can be trained to in the field 
during these exercises.  Once again, the goal is for the communications to continue to flow and 
weapons employment to continue even though a possibly large number of satellite assets are not 
available. 
The education portion is designed to augment the exercise training.  Web-based training 
can be used to inform users of potential threats to satellites and allow them to examine their 
critical vulnerabilities.  This then shows commanders where they should focus their efforts and 
lets them tailor their own planning based on realistic criteria.  Also, training on how to get 
information on satellite status or who to contact in case of technical issues could be delivered on-
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line.  Sample plans for augmenting or replacing capability lost by satellites could be stored in an 
online repository and could be linked to units that have adapted them for their own use.  Like the 
other on-line training, any prerequisite training could be easily tracked and reports on readiness 
could be generated with little effort.  The eventual goal would be certify deploying units at the 
Component Warfare Commander level as Tier 1 certified meaning they have immediate plans at 
the ready and can continue to prosecute their mission even in a denied environment. 
While these plans are ambitious for a section of the Department of National Space that 
ostensibly is operating on a “shoe-string” budget, they are fully realizable.  Utilizing a blend of 
electronic training media with training representatives in the field or at the Operations Centers 
would ensure that goals are met while utilizing resources intelligently and efficiently.  The end-
product is well-trained satellite operators and users that are prepared for the worst case scenario 
and still can execute their mission even in the most trying of situations.  If defeating an attack is 
our most responsive option, this is the next-best thing.  
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VI. TIER 2 
 The Tier 2 portion of the Department of Space is focused on improving space related 
actions that take place in the timeframe of weeks to months.  This effort focused heavily on 
launch operations and processes for day-to-day business and casualty situations.  With the goal 
of making these operations more responsive in mind, the group analyzed the current system to 
identify bottlenecks and deficiencies which delay space programs.  Items identified for 
improvement include:  1) Fractured management and accounting, 2) Satellite availability, 3) 
Facilities (Processing and Launch Pads), 4) Launch vehicle availability, and 5) Integration and 
Test timelines.  These items represent places where breakdowns occur, in today’s way of doing 
business, that lead to increased costs and a general lack of responsiveness (Wertz, “Responsive 
Launch Vehicle” 2).   
 Department of Space will give decision making and budget authority to a single authority 
to implement the required solutions to these problems.  Under Department of Space the 
following changes will be made to improve responsiveness:  1) Use of a common research bus to 
improve technology injection and maintain launch proficiency, 2) Reduce facility bottlenecks 
through improved infrastructure, 3) Better accounting for launch expenses and facility use, 4) 
Reduced test time at launch sites, 5) Mandatory sparing policy for satellites and launch vehicles, 
and 6) Stimulating industry.  Many options were considered and evaluated on a comparison 
basis.  The planned functions of Department of Space and options considered by the group will 
be discussed in detail in the following pages. 
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A. COMMON SATELLITE BUS ARCHITECTURE 
  Due to the harsh environment of space, all new, unproven technology and its 
accompanying components must undergo qualification testing to establish its reliability and 
suitability for operations in this environment.  The testing of new technology is a necessary, but 
often lengthy and expensive process.  Sometimes, untested technology is not considered for 
current or future space programs because of the level of associated risk.  More often, testing new 
technology becomes a large part of the development phase of acquiring a new system and it 
increases cost and schedule in an already difficult acquisition process.  Additionally, small 
commercial space hardware developers are often unable to overcome this barrier to market entry 












Table 2 Vehicle Comparison-Prices of American Launch Vehicles 
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One of the primary challenges associated with space qualification testing for emerging 
technology is the enormous expense associated with the launch process.  A previous study of 
pricing models for comparison of launch vehicles is shown in Table 2 (Isakowitz 4).  Although 
this study was conducted four years ago, it presents a picture of an industry that is not very 
receptive to casual or slow scientific development programs considering an investment in space 
technology.  It is also an indicator of the emergence and growth of the spaceport facility and 
launch vehicle industry as a lucrative business.  The commercial launch industry has certainly 
picked up on this idea, and commercial launch providers like SpaceX have emerged as real 
competitors to the government launch regime for small payload missions.   
  The emergence of commercial competition, however, has not to date resulted in the 
reduction of overall launch costs.  Commercial vendors looking to add their innovations to the 
next available payload for testing, experimentation and qualification will pay what the current 
market will bear, which, unfortunately, is quite a lot.  Of all the expenses associated with 
developing new satellite systems, including development of new sensors and technology, the 
launch process remains the single largest cost requirement that programs must fund.  One 
estimate indicated that high launch costs are responsible for about one-half of the total cost of 
new satellite systems (London 3).    
Adding to this cost dilemma for new technology developers is the lack of a common 
architecture that provides commercial industry with the specifications for a common design to 
build their products.  Thus, each program must virtually start from scratch in their bus design and 
development or look for a previous platform design that may have provided capability similar to 
their needs.  This “hand crafted” approach drives up the non-recurring engineering costs of new 
programs and adds to the dilemma presented by the high cost of launch.  An example from one 
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study compared the cost of processors for space use.  The current cost of a space certified 
processor was quoted to range from between $200,000 and $500,000 to provide the same amount 
of processing capability as found in most personal computers (Summers 5).  Ultimately, these 
factors often prove daunting enough to keep new technology out of the space business altogether.  
B. COMMON RESEARCH BUS 
The idea of designing and implementing a standardized bus for responsive space has been 
around for some time.  Initially, the requirement to make this standardization was directed by the 
OSD and resulted in the assemblage of the ORS Bus Standards Initiative, a joint effort including 
the Naval Research Lab, Johns Hopkins University, MIT, and Air Force Space and Missile 
Command (Summers 1).   This directive was initiated for the purpose of establishing a common 
standard for a future space bus design.  The primary intent behind this idea was to provide a 
standardized bus for the purpose of generating a responsive space launch capability.   
Analyzing the requirements of Tier 2 responsive space, the team identified items that 
would: a) encourage the development and qualification of new technology for inclusion in future 
space programs; b) provide a way to drive down the operations cost of space launch for new 
technology while adding overall value to the space industry; and c) provide a regular program of 
launches to support that idea.  Of primary importance to this idea is the cost effective injection of 
new technology into future space efforts by providing a low cost, dependable means to attain 
space testing and qualification.  Secondary benefits to this program would also exist.  A regular 
launch schedule for science and technology payload testing would also yield the benefits of 
improvement and standardization of launch processes at our various launch sites.  An additional 
benefit to the idea of a standardized bus is the possibility that a responsive launch (even launch-
on-demand) could be achieved by using these standardized components. 
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By establishing and publishing the specifications for the common bus architecture for 
research and development, industry can use these guidelines for all new technology developed 
for space testing and qualification.  This will lead to economies of scale that drive down 
production costs compared to the current practice of building a unique bus architecture for each 
launch.  Manufacturing costs will be reduced, as will integration testing costs.  The common bus 
architecture presents the possibility of reducing a large portion of required testing through the 
development of common interfaces throughout the architecture.  With common components and 
standardized interfaces, commercial space industry technology could focus on building their 
products with the capability to correctly interface with the common bus from design day one. 
This approach would preserve the cost benefits of a mass producible standard bus, while 
optimizing performance.   It could also reduce the component certification documentation and 
reduce some of the obstacles that currently exist for the new technology.    
 We considered the idea of a common bus architecture for ALL payloads (rather than just 
R&D use), but rejected it after further thought.  There is no “one size fits all” for satellite buses.  
A bus optimized for the eclipse period, altitude and radiation exposure of Low Earth Orbit, for 
example, would not be optimal for use in Geosynchronous Earth Orbit.  Similarly, a bus built to 
support the power and size requirements of a robust communications satellite could not be the 
same as a bus to support the delicate sensor suite of a missile warning satellite.  In the end, we 
decided it was best for each program to develop their own unique buses to support their unique 
payloads.  We deliberately decided to limit the commonality of a generic bus to research and 
development.   
 Using Wertz’ measures of effectiveness for evaluating responsiveness, a common bus for 
research and development payloads that is used as a “build-to” criteria for industry developers 
  58 
gains our Department of Space many advantages (Wertz, “ORS Mission Utility and Measures of 
Effectiveness” 3).  In the area of responsiveness, it will decrease our total response time and 
development time by providing an industry agreed upon standard for future engineering and 
payload qualification testing.  By establishing a common bus architecture, our ability to support 
various types of new payloads and technology will make this a multi-mission utility supporting 
platform.  As launches are conducted on a regular, continuous basis, the average overall cost per 
mission will decrease, which will result in a cost savings for all the participants sharing the 
launch expense.  Finally, a common bus architecture will provide the Department of Space and 
industry an established standard to use to reconstitute assets in the event a responsive launch is 
needed to replace lost assets or inject new capabilities into orbit.   
C. REGULAR LAUNCH SCHEDULE 
Along with the idea of a common research bus, Department of Space Tier 2 functions 
would plan a regular launch program for the specific purpose of promoting the development and 
qualification of new technology from the commercial, scientific, and academic communities.  By 
integrating various new technology components from these communities into our standard 
architecture, the cost share among the Department of Space and industry will greatly reduce the 
impact on each participant.  Wertz, in his study of launch vehicle cost models, determined that 
“for all the options considered, the cost per launch decreases with increasing number of launches 
per year” (2).  In the traditional process, launch vehicles are effectively built for each individual 
mission and must be ordered months or years in advance.  In Department of Space, with a system 
of regularly scheduled launches, vehicles would be built for inventory and removed for use when 
needed for common bus launches.  Once used, the vehicle is replaced by another.  This would 
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require a greater investment in production cost for the overall fleet of vehicles, but the cost per 
vehicle would be reduced.   
As a model of how this process would work, consider the following scenario.  Several 
commercial vendors, through the national labs or through open dialog with the Department of 
Space, coordinate integration of their new technology onboard our regular launch program for 
the next fiscal year.  Each of these vendors has products that they wish to test in a space 
environment for the purpose receiving space qualifications before manufacturing and marketing 
their products.  One vendor has developed a new photovoltaic for power production; another has 
developed a new lithium ion battery pack; the third wants to test a new imaging payload.  Our 
national labs also have new technology to test onboard this same space launch.  Because all three 
vendors have built their product to work with our standardized bus, integration and testing 
proves to be a relatively smooth process.  Because these vendors are not the sole participants in 
the launch, they will spread the fixed costs of the launch over a number of organizations, 
decreasing the cost to each.  The Department of Space program for regularly scheduled launch 
has increased its number of launches per year, the cost per launch is reduced.  Processing and 
launch facilities personnel will refine their processes and operating procedures because of our 
regular launch schedule, making our crews and facilities personnel more efficient.   
D. LAUNCH FACILITIES 
One of the biggest bottlenecks and vulnerabilities in the launch process is the limited 
launch facilities at US launch bases.  In the post 9/11 world, it should be clear that redundancy 
and a disaster recovery plan are important facets of every organization.  This is especially true 
for government organizations vital to national security.  US launch sites have yet to learn this 
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lesson.  The lack of redundant facilities at the launch bases not only inhibit our ability to process 
and launch quickly, but make us vulnerable to natural disaster, terrorism and acts of war. 
Today’s Capabilities 
Currently there are many launch bases around the world.  For the purposes of responsive 
space launch, the group focused on bases within the United States and US territories.  Relying on 
launch bases in other countries puts us at unnecessary risk.  Our allies today may not be our 
allies tomorrow, or they may feel pressure from other countries to ultimately and suddenly deny 
us access to their facilities.  By limiting ourselves to U.S. facilities (which we do today anyway), 
we are able to provide assured access to and better protection of our critical launch infrastructure.   
Within the US, the group focused on the four major federal launch sites:  Vandenberg 
AFB, Cape Canaveral AFS (for the purposes of this paper, CCAFS also includes the NASA 
Kennedy Space Center), Wallops Island VA, and the Reagan Test Site at Kwajalein Island.  
Additionally, many states, like New Mexico, Wisconsin, Washington, California, Texas and 
Alabama have planned spaceports.  The extent and mission of these spaceports is unclear and 
varies greatly from state to state.  Some are only planning rocket engine test pads, and runways 
for future space planes.  New Mexico stands above most of the other states with their 
commitment to becoming a major player in the future commercial spaceflight industry.  They 
have committed state funding and are providing financial incentives to companies to base out of 
their spaceport (Reid A03).  None of the spaceports have current plans to host traditional rocket-
launched assets and most could not meet the necessary overflight restrictions.   
Of the four major active launch sites, Cape Canaveral is the best established and has the 
largest number of active and inactive pads.  They currently have six active pads, 1 more in the 
works and over 25 inactive pads (“Cape Canaveral”).  The 25+ inactive pads are in various states 
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of disrepair, most with cracked concrete aprons overgrown with weeds.  The real estate, 
however, is still available for future expansion.  The six active pads include 2 Delta II pads, 2 
Shuttle pads, one Delta IV, and one Atlas V.   The pad under 
development is an old Titan pad that is being converted by 
SpaceX to accommodate their Falcon 9 vehicle.  Vandenberg 
AFB is just slightly smaller than CCAFS in terms of current 
launch facilities.  They have five active pads and five inactive.  
The active pads include one each for the Delta II, Delta IV, Atlas 
V, Falcon 1, and Minotaur (FAA Report  46).  Wallops Island VA 
is a site run by NASA used primarily for their test and small payload launches.  They have six 
active pads for those purposes (FAA Report 47).  In the near future, SpaceX will finish building 
their launch facility for the Falcon 9 (Heavy) launch vehicle on Omelek Island at the Reagan 
Test Site on Kwajalein atoll (FAA Report 26-27).   
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Figure 10 U.S. Spaceports 
 
Issues 
This study identified two major causes of the current lack of responsiveness in launch 
facilities:  the absence of redundant facilities and the lack of centralized control.  At the two 
major launch bases that the US government relies on for their most critical national assets, there 
is only one of each type of launch pad.  The pads are proprietary based on launch vehicle type.  
The lack of redundancy leads to processing bottlenecks; where one mission is waiting for another 
to finish processing or launch so that they can continue on their path.  The advent of EELV has 
alleviated that somewhat.  Heavy missions should be capable of flying on either the Atlas V or 
Delta IV rockets, but there is still only one of each pad/facility at the site.  Besides, the ability to 
launch on either one does not equate to being prepared to launch on either one.  While 
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technically feasible, the missions only make a payload adapter for the rocket they are expecting 
to fly on.  If they switch platforms at the last minute, they will have to stand down and wait for 
another payload adapter to be made or shipped out and change the various fittings to 
accommodate it.   
In addition to bottlenecks at the pads, there are also tie-ups at the processing facilities 
caused by a lack of centralized oversight.  Some of the smaller pads can only accommodate 
single processing.  Even in a two high-bay facility, there are documented cases of satellites being 
stuck in the transfer aisle and blocking access to either bay.  When the Air Force and NRO are 
sharing processing facilities, sometimes there are conflicts related to program classifications.  
Access to a processing facility, even though there may be room, can be blocked due to the 
sensitive nature of the payload being prepared for launch.  Before it goes into the payload fairing, 
access to the payload is highly restricted.  There have been cases where unclassified programs 
sharing the facilities with the NRO have been delayed until the NRO payload is done processing 
or is fully covered.   
Vulnerabilities 
While overcrowding is the main cause of the facilities lack of responsiveness, more 
extreme cases also exist.  Natural, accidental, or purposeful destruction of a launch pad or 
processing facility would shut down the launch pipeline for that vehicle-type until it could be 
repaired.  Weather is highly volatile in the Cape Canaveral area, for example, and hurricanes and 
tornados are frequent visitors.  It is very possible to have a facility wiped out by one.  An 
accidental or deliberately caused explosion on the launch pad or soon after launch could also rain 
down enough fuel and debris to cause serious damage and months of costly refurbishment, 
delaying multiple programs.  Redundant facilities are clearly needed and they require some 
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amount of geographical separation.  Two adjacent vehicle High-bays, for example, may allow for 
two missions to process at once, but they could BOTH be wiped out in the same hurricane or 
explosion.  A redundant facility should be located on the same launch site, but far enough away 
to minimize the chance it could be damaged in the same destructive event. 
We also recognized the security vulnerabilities at todays launch sites.  Given that we 
have limited sites and facilities to launch our space assets from, we need to protect them.  We 
can not be responsive if the enemy targets and destroys our Federal launch sites and prevents us 
from replenishing our on-orbit assets.  As we have learned over and over, the most vulnerable 
part of a space system is the ground station.  We recommend ground-based missile defense (like 
Patriot), anti-aircraft, and similar systems be put into place to protect our launch bases at the 
Cape and Vandenberg.  In case of active conflict, combat air patrols should also operate over the 
launch bases to provide tight security. 
Measures of Effectiveness 
 We assessed the current situation, found the areas that lacked responsiveness, and came 
up with ideas to make them responsive by 2025.  In making these changes, we graded them 
against the Measures of Effectiveness described in Dr James Wertz’s paper.  These MoEs are 
done in a comparative manner against the systems and processes as they exist today.  We made 
Responsiveness our top priority, but were also able to make measurable changes in the areas of 
Cost, Flexibility, Risk and Coverage (Wertz, “ORS Mission Utility” 4).  There were other 
changes that we considered and rejected (like common bus for ALL missions, spares for ALL 
missions, dedicated facilities for each mission, launch vehicles standing by on the pad, launch on 
schedule rather than launch on demand).  For those rejected ideas, the MoEs did not pay off.  For 
example, for the idea of common bus for all missions, the savings in Cost were overwhelmed by 
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the marked negatives in Flexibility, Risk and Coverage.  For the ideas that were accepted, while 
some MoEs may have been worse when compared to the current situation, there was enough 
improvement in other areas to make the idea an overall winner.    
Multi-Use Facilities 
 By 2025, we will have redundant, multi-use pads and facilities at Vandenberg and Cape 
Canaveral.  The pads will be classified by vehicle class (small, medium, heavy) rather than 
specific vehicle type (Delta II, Atlas V, Minotaur, etc).  This is not a new idea.  The Florida 
Space Authority converted LC-46 (a former Trident missile test complex) at Cape Canaveral to a 
multi-use pad and it can handle a range of weights and sizes rather than only one specific vehicle 
type (“Space Launch Complex 46”).  Similarly, the California Spaceport converted SLC-8 at 
VAFB with an Integrated Processing Facility capable of processing and launching the Delta II, 
Delta IV and Atlas V as well as small AF and commercial payloads and rockets (FAA report 46-
47).   
We will begin by constructing Heavy-class back-up facilities at CCAFS and VAFB that 
could be used with our current Heavy vehicles, but not limited to them.  This will provide 
immediate redundancy for some of our most important national assets.  We will construct 
Medium and Small facilities at each site soon after.  Eventually, all launch facilities and pads 
will be converted to multi-use as they come due for renovations.  This eliminates the stove-
piping that currently exists and matches up with the changes we propose for crews and 
processing.  While this idea will require some start-up cost, for the design and implementation of 
the new facilities, it will ultimately result in lower Operations and Maintenance costs.  The Cost 
MoE is worse in comparison with how things are done today (especially in the near term), but 
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there are significant gains in Responsiveness (Total Response Time) and Flexibility (Multi-
mission Utility).  In this case, the positives outweigh the negatives.   
 Due to consolidation of workforce and the efficiencies gained by repetitive launch 
activities, we plan on limiting our launch sites to the four existing Federal sites.  CCAFS and 
VAFB will continue to launch the missions they do and be the highest traffic sites, Wallops will 
be the primary site for our R&D satellites using our common bus, and Reagan will serve as the 
“warm” back-up for the GEO and other Heavy launches.  The Reagan Test Site will be our 
emergency back-up launch point for Heavy rockets due to its proximity to the Equator and easy 
inject into GEO orbit.  We will continue to use CCAFS as our primary site for GEO launches, 
but if that site is destroyed or there is a national need to launch many GEO satellites at once (due 
to enemy or natural destruction) we will mobilize the workforce and resources to use the Reagan 
site as well.     
E.  CENTRALIZED SITE AUTHORITY 
 The formation of the Department of Space solves one of the other current problems with 
space launch:  the lack of centralized management of the launch sites.  Currently, the diversity of 
the organizations involved in launch, including the Air Force, NASA and the NRO, creates 
resource conflicts, prioritization issues, and duplication of efforts.  At Cape Canaveral, for 
example, NASA and the Air Force have duplicate support services (like firefighters) that could 
be better utilized with concentration of forces.  Single ownership and management under the 
Department of Space will reduce jockeying for priority, and the “launch chicken” that 
unnecessarily ties up valuable resources.  There are currently too many decision-makers in the 
“go for launch” meetings and the Department of Space puts that decision into a single voice.  
Centralized authority across all the federal sites also allows for missions to be moved from one 
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base to another based on facility or workforce availability or shifting national priorities.  
Centralizing site management costs us nothing, but probably will not specifically save money 
either, so it is a wash with the Cost MoE.  It will, however, lead to better Responsiveness (total 
response time is reduced through more efficient management) and Flexibility (the ability to 
direct missions to different facilities, and prioritize missions).   
Improved Accounting and Industry Incentives 
Centralized command and control will also lead to better cost accounting and 
reimbursement for commercial launches.  In 2000, commercial launches accounted for 40% of 
the launches at our Federal sites, but only 5% of the funding (The Future Management and Use 
of…  33).  It is in the government’s best interest to encourage commercial launch, and we will 
continue to incentivize them to do so, but we need to narrow the existing gap.  The financial 
incentives should be purposeful, not because of poor accounting practices.  Consolidating 
management at the launch bases will allow us to better understand all the government costs that 
go into supporting a commercial launch.   
The funding obtained from commercial launches will be reinvested in capital 
improvements at the launch sites.  The multi-use launch pads, for example, could be partially 
funded by commercial reimbursements.  Similarly, the United States is currently not a player in 
the Heavy lift commercial business.  Since the formation of the United Launch Alliance (Boeing 
and Lockheed teaming for EELV Heavy), those companies no longer seek commercial 
customers (Caceres 17).  They have come to rely on the government as their only customer 
because the government is willing to pay top dollar.  The government should encourage ULA to 
bring in more commercial customers for heavy lift (including international payloads).  It will be 
a win-win for industry and government.  It would give them more work and more profit; we 
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would benefit through reduced vehicle costs from economies of scale as well as more 
efficiencies in processing.  These actions will benefit us greatly in the Cost MoE.  We will save 
money per mission with the ULA idea, and save money per year with better cost accounting and 
commercial reimbursement.     
 These proposed changes are a great improvement in the responsiveness of launch.  The 
redundant and flexible launch facilities enable us to do simultaneous processing and near 
simultaneous launch.  In case of large-scale natural disaster in space or war affecting multiple 
satellites, Department of Space will be able to rapidly deploy spares.  It also enables our facilities 
here on earth to better withstand terror attack, sabotage, or natural weather disaster at one facility 
and carry on at another.  Centralized command and control has always been a key tenant of air 
power and now we can finally apply it to space as well.   
F. CREWS/PROCESSING 
 
Although the U.S. has been in the space business over half a century and most spaceport 
operations are tightly controlled from within, it is actually quite surprising the extent to which 
each of these facilities operates independent of the others.  Each spaceport and range has its own 
uniqueness, catering to the vehicle-specific designs and agency or organization specific missions 
common to that site.  Comparisons have often been made between the space industry and the 
aviation industry for studies in operational design and control.  Although each airport facility 
operates independently, there are inherent similarities that exist between them all: airplanes are 
moved from support hangars to fueling stations to gates where passengers are loaded.  
Simultaneously, cargo and luggage are uploaded, pilots conduct equipment checks, and the plane 
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eventually taxis to a runway for takeoff.  These activities are usually conducted in like manner 
regardless of the airport location.   
In contrast, spaceport operations tend to differ in how they conduct operations.  Within 
each individual spaceport there are nuances that in outside commercial industries would be 
indicators of inefficiency and lack of oversight.  Unlike the aviation industry, there is no 
integrated national approach in the ground and launch operations infrastructure of space 
facilities.  Even funding typically takes place at the implementation phase of vehicle 
architectures, causing space access capability to be operations-intensive and expensive.  Launch 
pads and processing facilities are usually built to support a single specific vehicle; launch support 
personnel are usually industry contracted, proprietary personnel that conduct vehicle specific 
support; and launch site coordinators tend to have little oversight of the status of each program as 
they approach various milestones in preparation for launch, since much of the processing is 
scattered between both outside industry locations and spaceport processing locations.  All of 
these are indicators of a broader operational inefficiency, which drives up launch costs and leads 
to launch or program delays.  As one study stated,  
“The biggest roadblock to reducing cost and deployment times is the launch 
platform.  Every proven launch service available today requires at least $15M and 24 
months from procurement to launch.  From payload delivery at the launch site to lifting 
off the pad is a minimum of six weeks.”  (Summers 6) 
   
Responsive launch must work to greatly reduce these estimates to meet the Tier 2 definition of 
responsiveness. 
Problems  
 To summarize the deficiencies within the U.S. launch facility program, the problems 
exist on two primary levels.  On the macro level, the U.S. government aerospace industry does 
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not view space access as a business, i.e., it is not driven by market requirements, so efficiency 
and effectiveness of ground operations and processing have not traditionally been considered key 
points to strive toward.  Secondly, operations have tended to be vehicle-centric rather than space 
transportation specific.  Ranges are configured and then reconfigured based on the next launch 
required and the type of vehicle to be used.  This “patchwork” approach of focusing on one 
vehicle architecture at a time rather than addressing a “suite” of architectures shows a lack of 
flexibility within the industry.  To add to the problem, ground infrastructure improvements are 
often overlooked as new spacelift programs are developed.  As vehicle architectures grow more 
diverse, space transportation infrastructure must develop more flexible, responsive ground 
operations and launch technologies that are more interoperable. 
On the micro level, there are three primary inefficiencies that we identified in ground 
facility infrastructure.  First is the lack of interoperability among spaceports and ranges.  
Individual facilities tend to be unique, complex and designed around a specific vehicle.  For 
responsive space to truly function, range operations should be standardized to the highest degree 
possible, so that personnel and processes are efficient.  Secondly, the workforce employed to 
support launch operations also tends to be proprietary with the commercial vehicle vender they 
support.  The end result is a workforce that is large, specialized, and often transitions between 
periods of gainful employment and lulls in activity.  Thirdly, data systems are disjointed and 
provide little oversight for launch facility managers to coordinate range operations with the 
various programs as they reach launch readiness milestones.  At the heart of Tier 2 
responsiveness is the ability to perform assembly, test, and launch operations in the most 
efficient manner.  Therefore, all of these deficiencies must be addressed for launch facility 
operations and processing to improve.   
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Department of Space Changes 
 In order for U.S. spaceports to achieve responsive launch capability, a serious study of 
ground processing, launch operations, and air traffic control/range operations systems must be 
conducted to identify shortfalls.  To improve launch facility operations, we recommend several 
changes that will need to be instituted within the Department of Space.  Unlike the current 
launch range scenario where operations have many months to plan and prepare for each launch, 
responsive launch will require crews/processing to be more adaptable and have a broader 
knowledge base of the inner workings of various types of vehicles and equipment.  Instituting a 
standardized operability policy will also positively impact ground launch infrastructure.  Launch 
pads and ground launch infrastructure will be required to accommodate rapid and possibly 
frequent payload integration, stacking, test, and checkout, as well as launch vehicle fueling, 
mission planning, etc.  To accomplish this, launch ranges will have to upgrade to accommodate 
responsive launches (Kolodziejski 2).  Ground systems will likely require highly robust and 
reliable automation systems for responsive launch operations.  The conceptual launch facility 
design will most likely incorporate the automation of various processes to facilitate responsive 
launch times defined in Tier 2 ORS.   
 Today’s space launch facility and processing operations involve outdated technology and 
equipment that is expensive and time-consuming to operate and maintain.  As a result, 45%-60% 
of the overall life cycle costs of a space transportation system program are attributed to ground 
and launch operations (Guidi 1).  In order to achieve responsive launch, upgrades will need to be 
integrated into future launch facilities to inject current technology for processing facilities.  Like 
the recommendation to make launch pads multi-mission capable, processing facilities will be 
more efficient and capable by redesigning them for multiple missions and vehicles.  By 
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increasing their ability to house and process various missions, potential bottlenecks in the 
processing flow can be avoided and changes in mission priorities can be more easily 
accommodated to support responsive launch needs.   
Networked Status Reports  
For launch range operations to work efficiently, launch facility managers should have 
complete visibility on the status of each program occupying resources at the launch facility (both 
infrastructure and personnel).  With proper oversight and coordination, key decisions to shift 
resources to priority tasks can be made with minimal impact on the flow of operations.  To 
smooth this process and ensure safety compliance, all processing assembly and test procedures 
should be prewritten and validated.  Testing should be automated to the greatest extent possible 
via a standard test port.  To minimize cost and time, the entire processing, testing and telemetry 
database should be web based for immediate and real time access by both Department of Space 
launch facility senior leaders as well as industry contractors.  This will facilitate remote 
troubleshooting or process monitoring by all area experts from anywhere internet access is 
available. 
Government or Government-contracted Launch Crews 
 Finally, under the Department of Space, personnel involved in launch processes would no 
longer consist solely of proprietary personnel with ties to commercial industry.  Instead, with 
safety and efficiency as the primary drivers for success, personnel, to the greatest degree possible 
would be trained to perform multiple operations on a variety of vehicles.  The launch facility 
support workforce would consist primarily of Department of Space personnel or those contracted 
directly by the department.  By training our personnel to work with a greater variety of our 
launch vehicle inventory and processing facilities, our workforce would be more efficient, 
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flexible and able to respond to Tier 2 needs.  By standardizing range processes throughout the 
Department of Space, surge requirements to support a responsive launch scenario at spaceports 
other than the Cape or Vandenberg would be more supportable, responsive, and safe.   
 By contracting our launch support personnel to work directly for the Department of 
Space and training them to conduct processing and launch on a variety of launch vehicles, we 
will add flexibility to our overall mission capability.  A standardized launch process throughout 
the department would also support this measure of effectiveness, as launch support would be 
virtually the same regardless of the spaceport involved.  In 2025 personnel from any launch 
facility could be used to support a responsive launch scenario requiring a surge of support at a 
specific location, e.g., at Kwajalein.  Regardless of the location they came from, these personnel 
would speak the same launch “language” and conduct operations similarly, increasing safety, 
responsiveness, and flexibility.   Our total response time to support a Tier 2 mission would 
ultimately be smoother and more responsive 
FULLY-CAPABLE SPARE SATELLITES 
 Discussing “responsive space” we have to be prepared to deal with events that will 
require a preplanned response of launching a new space asset.  One obstacle to this being 
possible in a timely manner is the availability of a capable satellite to replace the lost asset.  In 
the current system, a replacement payload would probably not be available because most 
programs cannot afford the added costs of including spares for contingencies such as an anti-
satellite weapon attack.  A replacement satellite could not be launched until a new payload and 
bus could be built or was in the constellation was ready.  This lack of spare can also lead to long 
gaps in coverage, increased costs, or delays.   
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The current system 
 In today’s vastly separated system, competing interests, like the Joint Strike Fighter and 
Littoral Combat Ship, take dollars from satellite programs.  While space is a national-level 
priority, it does not always compete well with other interests of the Service.  Schedule delays 
from these decisions to delay funding ultimately lead to cost increases which force cuts in the 
satellite programs.  It is a vicious cycle.  Allocating hundreds of millions of dollars for a spare 
satellite cannot be justified in a program that is already growing due to delays and overruns.  
Unfortunately, cost has become the primary driver in space development programs, replacing 
mission effectiveness. (U.S. Satellite Program…)  There is no common policy or goal; some 
programs are able to afford spares but most are not. 
 Additionally, the management of satellite systems has become reactive instead of 
proactive.  Today, because of the tough competition for funding faced by satellite programs, 
replacement systems are not planned until on-orbit systems are about to fail.  It is not unusual for 
a satellite to be vulnerable to a single point failure and, while each satellite may have a low 
probability of failure, the collective probability of failure in a constellation is high (Ayati 7). This 
has the potential to leave wide coverage gaps because a critical point, where a single on-orbit 
failure would lead to the loss of a required capability, has been reached.  Historically, satellite 
systems have lasted longer than their design lives, but this should not be relied upon as a safety 
net for poor planning of future systems.  Another effect of this type of thinking is the delay in 
new technological capabilities reaching users.  While satellites should be used for as long as they 
are beneficial, they must be updated as new needs arise.   
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Priorities 
 After careful consideration, the overhead assets were prioritized based on how essential 
they were to conducting operations in the current environment.  The highest priority group, 
Group 1, includes MILSATCOM and GPS.  These systems are essential for operations because 
of the numerous weapons systems that rely on them and the necessity to communicate with 
distributed forces at all times.  Group 2 includes weather and early warning systems.  These are 
not absolutely essential or are also being conducted by terrestrial assets that could be diverted in 
case of emergency.  Group 3 includes the national intelligence systems.  This group is “nice to 
have” but warfare and other operations can still be carried out without them.  Commercial 
satellites, airborne platforms and land based assets can provide much of the same information 
collected by Groups 2 and 3 for a small theater of operation, a specific area of interest, or for a 
limited time while a replacement can be produced. 
The Department of Space solution 
 Under the Department of Space in 2025, we will have a mandatory sparing policy for 
certain systems because it is preferable to use spare satellites to increase robustness rather than 
try to predict when satellites will fail (Ayati 7).  Based on these group classifications, all Group 1 
and 2 constellations would be required to have spares built into their programs.  This does not 
mean that these programs would be required to build a satellite that would be put in a warehouse 
and never flown.  Department of Space would employ a “first in first out” spare approach that 
means we need to have at least two satellites built before we launch the first one.   
On the initial production run, two complete, fully mission capable satellites would be 
produced.  The first satellite would be launched into the constellation and the other would be 
stored at the factory until the next vehicle in that series was completed.  Once the next vehicle is 
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complete, the “spare” will be launched and the newly completed satellite will be warehoused, 
thus becoming the de facto spare.  This cycle will be repeated until the last planned vehicle is 
completed.  The final satellite of the legacy constellation should overlap with the planned 
production of the initial order of replacement satellites which will then follow the same model.  
This should help reduce the gap that exists today between legacy and follow-on constellations.     
Options 
 Several remedies to this problem were considered including: new acquisition, a common 
bus system, reduced capacity spares, ground stored spares, and on orbit spares.  A new 
acquisition would take too long because it would require starting from the beginning and 
working the entire JCIDS process.  Even with a reduced timeline for priority programs, limits on 
expertise, materials, and assembly time would be prohibitive as most components are not readily 
available.  This type of capability replacement would take four to seven years to finally deploy 
into space.  A common bus system sounds good but would either place severe limitations on 
capability or cause high costs to meet the needs of all users.  As discussed earlier, there is no 
“one size fits all” solution for common buses.  Power, thermal, weight, and other requirements 
vary wildly from one orbit to another.  It would be unwieldy to try and develop a single bus that 
works well with all payloads in all orbits.  Reduced capacity spares would incur increased costs 
in engineering design and production.  There are no benefits to be gained to design and build less 
capable satellites as a gapfiller; they might as well be new satellites altogether.  Additionally, 
these limited-capability systems would not be designed for long duration use.  In this case, 
equivalent functions could be performed by terrestrial assets as a gap filling measure.   
Ground spares or on-orbit spares would only add additional costs to programs while 
providing little or no added value.  With no plan for employment, these spare satellites would 
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only be expensive insurance policies.  On-orbit spares face the additional cost of launch and the 
difficulties of being in the space environment, which is the biggest enemy of satellites.  The 
adversarial or space environment issue that knocked out the original satellite could just as easily 
knock out the spare.  The other drawback to keeping the spare on orbit is that a material problem 
in the constellation would be in your spare as well as the rest of the constellation and could not 
be repaired.  Also, the use of on-orbit spares requires the ability to communicate with a damaged 
satellite to realign the constellation (Ayati 7). 
Measures of Effectiveness 
 Evaluation of these options used a more general, comparative method based on the 
measures of effectiveness proposed by James Wertz for operationally responsive space.  The 
“first in first out” sparing option provides a solid mixture of responsiveness, risk mitigation, and 
coverage (Wertz, “ORS Mission Utility” 4).  Responsiveness was measured in terms of total 
response time to a Tier 2 need.  Risk mitigation was considered on the basis of the probability of 
mission success.  The coverage comparison was evaluated by the number of fully mission 
capable spacecraft.  This option was not the best for every category considered but it 
incorporates the best advantages for the overall desired goal.  The most responsive option is an 
on-orbit spare policy because assets would already be deployed.  This option was not chosen 
because it would incur ongoing operating costs and be susceptible to the same risks as the other 
satellites in the constellation.   
Responsiveness 
 The rotating spare option for our top two priority satellite systems was chosen because it 
provides a fully-capable spare, available on short notice with minimal impact on the constellation 
and the user.  The Department of Space oversight will allow all space interests to compete for 
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funding based on their importance as space assets only, not against other service specific 
programs.  Mandated spares on the highest two priority systems will ensure that the most critical 
capabilities are maintained in the event of a catastrophic failure or loss.  Proactive management 
of critical constellations will prevent gaps by overlapping successor systems and allow for the 
injection of new technologies more frequently.   
LAUNCH VEHICLE AVAILABILITY 
 A significant obstacle that would prohibit a timely replacement launch from occurring is 
the availability of a suitable launch vehicle.  Currently, launch vehicles are purchased as part of a 
program and managed by several organizations, or delivery of a satellite is taken on orbit and the 
manufacturer is responsible for launch.  Launch vehicles are purchased, assembled, and 
processed on an as-needed basis.  If a sudden need arose, such as a Tier 2 launch, a vehicle may 
not be available for some time.  This would cause significant delays and could lead to crippling 
gaps in coverage in high interest areas.  Realistic timelines are difficult to obtain in a push to 
avoid schedule delays and miss launch windows.  Launch vehicles typically represent 35 to 40 
percent of total costs and can be as high as 50 percent (McCartney 32).  Because of this high 
cost, there is little room available to plan for contingency operations in today’s system. 
The Department of Space solution 
 In the Department of Space system, two things would occur that would make launch 
responsive: 1) Programs would be required to purchase a spare booster in a similar fashion to the 
satellite spares program 2) Department of Space will utilize its common research bus to maintain 
a continuous launch schedule.  The spare booster policy will reduce average cost by increasing 
volume and, most importantly, ensure that the correct vehicle is available in a timely fashion.  A 
program will buy two of its required launch vehicles with its original order.  One vehicle would 
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go to the required launch site and be processed for the initial launch.  The other would be stored 
at the factory, ready for shipment.  This spare would then be used for the next launch in the 
constellation or for the short notice launch of the constellation spare or another compatible 
critical mission asset.  The next vehicle purchased by the satellite program would then be built 
and stored at the factory as a stand-by until the next planned launch. This allows for the 
possibility of launch from a back-up launch site in the event of a casualty by transporting the 
spare vehicle already on hand.   
 Additionally, the common research bus program would select a launch vehicle to be used 
for all of its launches.  The planned schedule is for one launch per month to reduce per unit costs, 
maintain proficiency, and allow numerous opportunities for access to space.  Today’s studies 
estimate that two to four launches per year would be necessary to maintain proficiency 
(McCartney 32).  Department of Space will be prepared to launch one research bus per month.  
This vehicle and bus would be available to meet the needs of any system that was compatible 
with it.  This would allow for a worst case of one month to the next scheduled launch fitting into 
the Tier 2 timeline. 
Emergency recovery launch 
 Because Department of Space will absorb NASA, an emergency recovery capability will 
have to be maintained.  Department of Space will require that for manned missions, two launch 
vehicles must be flight ready.  One vehicle will be used for the planned launch and one made 
ready for a possible rescue mission.  This will ensure that the crew could be rescued in the event 
of an emergency.  This capacity would be required for both commercial space flight and 
government exploration missions.  An emergency rescue service, similar to the Coast Guard, 
may even become necessary and would be possible under this plan for operations. 
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Options 
The group considered several options including:  stockpiling various launch vehicles, 
procuring one emergency spacelift platform and mandating compatibility, having ready stand-by 
vehicles in a fueled or unfueled status, order-on-demand contracting authority, maintaining the 
current system, and stockpiling one vehicle type per orbital regime.  Stockpiling the numerous 
launch vehicles available would be cost prohibitive due to the variety employed.  This option 
also has difficulty in reconciling the numerous launch sites with the correct launch vehicle.  It 
would be even more impractical to maintain an inventory of launch vehicles at each launch site 
for contingency operations that may never occur.  The following picture shows only the EELV 








Figure 11 EELV Family of Rockets 
 
Designing one emergency spacelift vehicle to be used for all short order launch cases 
would place additional burden on program offices and the per vehicle cost would be high 
because the vehicle would be required to service all orbits and the entire size and shape range of 
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satellites in production.  Launch vehicles have become specialized due to the specific demands 
of injection into different orbital regimes.   
Having vehicles standing by, whether fueled or unfueled, would require significant 
ongoing costs in manpower, facilities, and equipment.  A launch vehicle waiting on the pad 
would be susceptible to damage and would eventually need to be replaced with out ever being of 
any benefit to the program.  This option would not provide a significant advantage in time or 
cost.   
The use of specific procurement authority was discussed.  This option may require the 
complete production of a vehicle from the ground up, leading to significant delays and falling 
outside even the several month timeframe.  Utilizing a new acquisition process for each new 
satellite is cost prohibitive and is not responsive. 
An argument could also be made for maintaining the current system, accidents excepted; 
satellites that are built will eventually be launched.  Today, the program offices decide which 
kind and how many of each launch vehicle they need for their satellite systems.  This can lead to 
significant schedule delays, or even coverage gaps, caused by a single point failure.  
Unfortunately, required launch vehicles represent a large portion of program budgets and are a 
difficult decision point in any case.  In the current environment, it is not practical for a satellite 
constellation to budget for desired system capacities let alone extra launch vehicles. Cost is the 
driving factor in most programs today (U.S. Satellite Program…).  Consideration was also given 
to procuring spare vehicles capable of reaching each orbital regime.  Because of the varying sizes 
of payloads and their varied orbital requirements, this would also become a large and prohibitive 
undertaking.  
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Measures of Effectiveness 
 Using the Wertz measures of effectiveness as a basis, the options were evaluated on a 
comparison basis.  The adoption of the launch vehicle spare policy was based primarily on its 
responsiveness and the probability of mission success (Wertz, “ORS Mission Utility” 4).  This 
option was not the best in every category but provided the best overall solution to the problems 
faced in making space responsive.  For example the most responsive option would be to have 
stand-by vehicles for emergency launch.  This option would have an extremely high cost from 
maintaining the vehicle ready while only improving the response by a few weeks.  This cost 
could not be justified.   
Responsiveness  
 This system of spares, continuous launch cycles, and emergency launch capability will 
allow Department of Space to respond to any scenario requiring launch in weeks to months.  The 
spare program ensures that each program will have a launch vehicle available for a contingency 
launch operation.  The continuous launch cycle will maintain proficiency and improve 
performance in integration and launch operations, which can reduce time and cost for launch 
operations.  Maintaining a regular schedule of launches provides a continuous cycle of launches 
that can be utilized as a backup to the traditional system.  Providing a backup manned launch 
vehicle will ensure that rescue operations can be initiated within one week.  In addition to 
changes made in the operating and procurement cycles, other changes made by Department of 
Space will support responsiveness as culture.  The common operating picture for launch 
processing, common range management, and networked ground facilities will aid in information 
flow and help eliminate delays, leading to cheaper, more efficient, and faster launch operations.  
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These changes will give the Department of Space the ability to respond to emergent needs and 
improve day to day operations. 
Tier 2 Conclusion 
 These changes to the current system will reduce cost and risk while improving the 
flexibility and responsiveness of space operations (Wertz, “ORS Mission Utility” 4).  Enhanced 
facilities, better processing oversight and procedures, and shorter testing timelines will improve 
day-to-day operations.  The sparing policy for boosters and satellites and the construction of 
flexible launch facilities will provide the ability to rapidly respond to a casualty or hostile action 
with a fully capable replacement in a short period of time.  These changes represent the most 
responsive option for all types of operations that occur in Tier 2. 
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VII. TIER 3 
 We determined that today’s space plans and policies lack an emphasis on being 
operationally responsive.  We agreed that a scrub of current space plans and policies, in doctrine, 
acquisition processes and the science community needed to take place.  We reviewed those plans 
and policies that benefit the function of being operationally responsive and created new policies 
to increase responsiveness to our customers, the DoD and IC.   We envisioned the Department of 
Space being able to determine future operational and timeliness requirements as the responsive 
space solutions’ leading advocate. 
 Tier 3 efforts would be placed under the office of the Secretary of Space and 
Undersecretary of Space Plans and Policies. There, new space plans and policies would focus on 
timeliness and responsiveness, and would facilitate a new cultural mindset within strategic 
documents and doctrine.    The Department of Space Plans and Policy office would work closely 
with space S&T/R&D labs and scientific organizations to develop and implement technology 
standards for responsive space systems.  Consolidation of the space community under one 
department could ensure the organization’s responsive mentality is clearly communicated 
throughout all levels of space acquisition and space science communities.  It would also allow 
limited cross-talk between engineers and scientists working on related classified and unclassified 
projects, fostering ideas and solutions without necessarily providing program specific 
information.  SCIFs and classified facilities and information systems will enable better 
communication of requirements and ideas within the department and from users in various 
geographic regions throughout the world. 
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 The Undersecretary of Space for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics shall create plans 
and policies focused on responsiveness and ensure they are written into new acquisition 
development processes.   Acquisition models will be altered and processes revamped to provide 
quicker space system development time.  In our opinion, responsive acquisition is not just about 
developing a new system from scratch to launch and placing it in operation in a shorter timeline, 
it is also about delivering what was promised on schedule and on budget.  Contractors will be 
held accountable for delays and penalized monetarily.  With less budget pressure because of a 
single authority within the Department of Space allows for more realistic cost estimates without 
the fear of losing space dollars to a separate program like new fighter planes.   The entire space 
community would be made aware of current programs’ progress and status through a virtual, 
collaborative environment displaying each program’s specifics.  All programs shall be held 
accountable to the same rigorous and demanding acquisition requirements, equally and without 
prejudice.  Additionally, the Department of Space Acquisition office will have the authority to 
reposition efforts between Priority I (national crisis), II (military responsive programs), and III 
(scientific research) programs.  In a national emergency, the Department of Space will have the 
authority and capability to move scientists, funding and resources between programs depending 
on were efforts need to be focused (see Department of Space Acquisition Chart below). 
Under the Department of Space, Acquisition programs would become better prioritized. 
 Priority of effort could be determined by impact on national security, cost, or schedule 
requirements.  In the chart below, the top two arrows represent acquisition programs that take 
months to years to develop.  They include non-military programs (think NASA) and military and 
intelligence community programs respectively.  The bottom red arrow represents a program that 
needs to be developed in a shorter time span based upon national security needs.  In time of 
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national crisis, perhaps a threat from a new counter space system, personnel and resources, 
including funding, would be pulled from lower priority programs to help create or operate a 
Priority 1 program.  Of course, development of programs under Priority 1 would require 
exceptional funding and entail extensive efforts, but obtaining the personnel power and resources 
for such an endeavor, under the Department of Space, would be a reality.  This is another way in 
which Tier 3 programs could prove more responsive than todays construct in developing new 
space technologies and space programs. 
Responsive Acquisition
– Within the Department of Space
• Priority of Effort determined by cost and time requirements
Non-MIL ACQ (45 - 50 %)
MIL & IC ACQ (45 - 50 %)
Months to Years
Weeks to Months
• $ - Most cost effective
• Least Operationally Responsive
• Not Urgent/Not “Important” (NASA) 
• Priority III
• $$ - Cost effective
• More Operationally Responsive
• Not Urgent / “Important” (Most military / 
Intelligence systems) 
• Priority II
• $$$ - Least Cost effective
• Most Responsive
• Urgent AND Important (Few systems) 
• Priority I
National Emergency (usually 
small %)
 
Figure 12 Department of Space Acquisition 
 
An Assistant Secretary for Science and Technology could have oversight and influence in 
promoting responsive Tier 3 requirements within the space S&T/R&D community.  The office 
will actively seek out responsive space technologies and facilitate programs for faster space 
technology development, as well as enable quicker technology insertion into operational 
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environments.  Annual space symposiums would continue to focus on up and coming 
operationally responsive space initiatives.  S&T offices within the Department of Space will 
work closely together to develop long term responsive planning and responsive space technology 
development.  They will cooperate with users from the DoD and IC communities to understand, 
refine and develop requirements.  They will prioritize responsive space requirements and 
consolidate program efforts when possible.   
The entire Department of Space construct will be a more efficient process ensuring the 
warfighter and IC requirements are known, vetted, budgeted for and effectively met (see 
Department of Space S&T Chart below).  More effective and cheaper ways of hardening 
satellites would be explored.  Increased mobility in space, without the associated fuel costs 
would be developed.  S&T initiatives would attempt to create new ways to predict solar storms 
and impacts on satellites and space systems.  Improved and more efficient launch methods would 
also be developed.  Labs would continue to exist in their current construct, however their efforts 
would be verified, consolidated when necessary, vetted and funded based upon priorities 
required.  The Department of Space consolidation would allow such authority to exist where it 
currently does not. 







Figure 13 Department of Space Acquisition S&T Flow 
 
Tier 3 Conclusion 
 While cost was considered for measuring the effectiveness of the Department of Space’s 
assumption of responsibilities and resulting responsiveness, at least from plans and policy, 
acquisition and S&T/R&D perspectives, we decided it is not be the best measure of 
effectiveness.  The best measures of effectiveness for Tier 3 include responsiveness, efficiency 
and flexibility.  The consolidation of the Department of Space would result in more efficient 
communication between members of the space community and the development of space plans 
and policies that focus on responsiveness.  The Department of Space will determine what 
standards are for timeliness and responsiveness.  The Department of Space will develop more 
efficient acquisition processes that result in less waste and cost overruns and are focused on 
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responsiveness to military and intelligence requirements, and when necessary, respond faster 
than today’s systems to national emergencies.  The Department of Space will prevent duplication 
of efforts or lack of efforts for necessary S&T initiatives, unless those efforts are necessary and 
beneficial to users’ requirements.  This increased efficiency would probably result in lower costs 
in the long run, however, startup costs and consolidation costs could prove extremely expensive 
in the short term.  It may take many years of efficient operation to re-coup the costs of 
reorganization. 
 Under Department of Space consolidation, Development Time and Technology Insertion 
Time, both subsets of the measure of effectiveness “responsiveness” would greatly improve.  
Under a Department of Space with a responsive mindset, the time necessary to develop 
responsive space technologies would decrease.  Also under the Department of Space construct, 
technology insertion time would decrease with new space policies focused on responsiveness to 
warfighters’ and intelligence professionals’ needs.  Additionally, improved communication flow, 
a controlled budget, and the elimination of duplication of efforts would all lend to a more 
efficient and focused construct than currently exists within the space community. 
  The Department of Space offices will ensure customers requirements are met as quickly 
as possible and will provide a conduit for users, labs and funding organizations to communicate 
freely and rapidly.  By the consolidated nature of the Department of Space, all innovative or new 
space related technology developers will have one government organization to which they can 
present their ideas and prospective technologies.  A collaborative virtual environment, listing 
program status and users’ requirements, would make efforts within the Department of Space 
transparent to approved users and members of the commercial sector.  The consolidation of 
efforts within the Department of Space, as well as the consolidation of funding for operationally 
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responsive space S&T projects would allow those programs to be prioritized and funded 
according to the most demanding national security requirements.  The bottom line is that 
consolidation of efforts under the Department of Space will ensure more efficient processes in 
Tier 3, months to years, functions.  The more efficient processes will prevent the duplication of 
efforts in technology initiatives that exist today.  Funding for programs will be competitive and 
determined by real and prioritized needs.  All members of the Department of Space will have 
insight into the programs being developed and will be able to comment and affect positive 
changes within those programs.  These improvements in efficiency and operations will 
ultimately result in greater responsiveness for our users. 
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VIII. SCENARIOS 
We chose to evaluate four likely or critical scenarios and the ability of our architecture to 
be responsive.  Following are the four scenarios. 
• Scenario 1-Battlefield Space: Major conflict with a military peer.  With ASATs 
targeting our critical satellites; our defensive counter space capabilities, redeployment 
capabilities and our quick launch capabilities will all be challenged. 
• Scenario 2-Loss of UHF SATCOM  
• Scenario 3-Major event not covered by satellite observation.  This scenario does not 
elicit a space response.   
• Scenario 4-Emerging technology developed for greatly increased communication 




The battlefield space scenario is one that people envision when they cite our soft 
underbelly of space.  Since we depend on space more than any other country in the world, and 
we have limited ability to protect our space assets:  Space is our “Achilles Heel” (Crosier 19).  
This critical scenario must be addressed because of the severity of the consequences.  It is 
thought that any battle with a near peer will target our satellites and ground stations first, to 
prevent the use of our space based assets in retaliation.  In this scenario our responsiveness is 
most apparent.  With our robust SSA we use predictive analysis to attempt to preserve the assets 
targeted.  The targeted satellites will have offensive and defensive countermeasures that increase 
their survival rate.  Satellite ground stations, and launch bases have robust missile defense 
systems that can thwart most attacks.  If our defenses fail, our warfighters have trained in a 
denied environment, so the impact of lost assets is minimized.  For any lost satellites we 
immediately take measures to recover the lost capacity.  First, we will look to terrestrial means to 
recover the capacity in the short term.  Second, we will augment our capacity in any other way 
we can, including purchasing commercial communications and IMINT.  Third, we will begin 
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repositioning on orbit assets and start the launch sequence for spare satellites with spare launch 
vehicles on spare, flexible launch pads.  Last, we will analyze our points of failure and begin 
development of assets that are more difficult to deny.  This scenario shows responsive 
capabilities from each tier and is a strong advocate for the need of responsiveness in the form of 
the Department of Space. 
Scenario 2 
A more likely scenario is loss of a single satellite, like UHF SATCOM for example.  This 
scenario could be brought on by:  Enemy action, environment, or equipment malfunction.  In 
each case the responsiveness is apparent.  Our capable SSA system would alert us within minutes 
if we lost a satellite.  Ops centers would inform their users in near-real-time and work on 
replacing that capability, by purchasing commercial bandwidth or using terrestrial means.  The 
users would be trained to execute pre-planned responses and operate without UHF SATCOM.  If 
a satellite was lost, a spare satellite would be launched quickly.  The robust SSA would let us 
know why we lost the satellite and we would begin developing technologies that could prevent 
future losses of satellite capability. 
Scenario 3 
Another likely scenario is a major event, like a foreign weapons test, timed specifically so 
that there are no US national space assets available to observe it.  This scenario does not elicit a 
space response.  Terrestrial assets may be used to observe, but our responsive space program 
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Scenario 4 
A startup company has developed a new disruptive space technology.  They are unsure 
who within the space community could best benefit from their new or improved process or 
system.  Under the Department of Space construct, those individuals would intuitively know they 
have to contact someone within the Department of Space to sell their technology.  Through the 
Department of Space / S&T virtual collaborative environment, they would find out whether their 
idea is truly a novel idea or new approach.  They would learn of potential user requirements they 
could satisfy.  They could request funding from within the Department of Space to further refine 
their research.  If the Department of Space determined that their technology was mature enough 
and relevant enough to current space operations, the startup company would be invited to attend 
and demonstrate their product at the yearly space symposium for responsive space.  Their 
product, once deemed relevant and worth consideration within the FY S&T funding budget, 
could be further refined or if ready, entered into the responsive space acquisition process.  If 
there happened to be a Priority I effort for national security taking place, their new space 
technology could immediately receive manpower, resources and funding.  If not a priority I 
effort, they would be directed to the appropriate acquisition process.  Prior to entering into 
production, the new technology would be matched to customer requirements, vetted, prioritized 
and funded if deemed worthwhile. 
 This entire process would be more responsive than the system as it exists today.  
Centralized control of the acquisition processes and S&T research funding, would ensure the 
new technology would be directed, in as quick and efficient process as possible, toward the 
appropriate user’s requirement. 
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The Dept of Space will be more responsive than today’s National Security Space 
Enterprise through:   
• Implementation of new policies and directives focused on responsiveness,  
• Changes within the acquisition process that enforce new standards and timeliness 
requirements  
• A new construct of the R&D and S&T community with the Department of Space in the 
center determining requirements, funding and which labs will do the work.   
 
The way in which a new technology is introduced and developed in the future, under the 
Department of Space, will be more responsive due to the Tier 3 changes mentioned above. 
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IX. WITHOUT A DEPARTMENT OF SPACE 
 The Department of Space is a huge catalyst for implementing most of our changes to be 
more responsive.  If we are unable to stand up the Department of Space, however, many of our 
recommended improvements to provide more responsive space to the warfighter and intelligence 
community are still possible.  
Tier 1 Improvements Without a Department of Space 
There are steps to improve Tier 1 responsiveness, even without the creation of a 
Department of Space.  Specific improvements that can be made without the creation of a new 
department are: 
• The JSPOC could be manned to provide the recommended situational and operational 
awareness that would enhance response time.   
• All DoD and IC space constellation mangers could be directed to provide the near-
real time situational and operational updates to the JSpOC. 
• Space-product customers could work with the JSpOC to report and request changes 
to, or losses of capability and capacity.   
• The JSpOC could be the central authority for space products, while the analysis 
centers would continue to assess and report on the products obtained. 
• The JSpOC could work with individual database managers to ensure obtained space 
products are added to the various databases. 
• The JSpOC could monitor commercial and non-space solutions, so that if DOD/IC 
space products are not available, requests can still be met in the Tier 1 response time 
frame. 
 
 The JSPOC is in the ideal situation to improve our Tier 1 response times.  It currently has 
visibility of most commercial and national systems, but is not empowered to force 
responsiveness.  The JSpOC is also not manned or funded to meet Tier 1 response times. With 
appropriate manning, improved connectivity and consolidation of appropriate SMEs, the JSpOC 
could achieve Tier 1 requirements.  
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There are areas of SSA and Counter Space changes that can be implemented without the 
formation of the Department of Space.  First, and most essential, would be to provide Joint 
Functional Component Command (JFCC) Space additional manning and statutory measures to 
empower this organization to actually give the Government an SSA near-real time picture.  The 
Joint Billets at JFCC Space current manning and operations are significantly below the necessary 
level to effect any change in space with only seven of twenty-eight billets filled (Santee 12).  
Getting the SSA and CS into the decision making process within the JSpOC or the DoD is a 
cultural change that will not be easy, but fundamentally could be accomplished without the 
Department of Space.  In light of the highly classified world of Counter Space, an effect that 
could be readily felt is to have a Counter Space representative at the larger space commands.  
This representative would help facilitate the Commander’s decision on what and how to do 
things with the tools Counter Space brings to the table.  None of these changes will be free, there 
will be a large up front cost, but if responsive change is going to happen, then these are needed.  
The face-to-face relationships needed for these changes are indispensable. 
 Without a Department of Space, several of the training initiatives for Tier 1 could still be 
implemented.  It has already been acknowledged that the training budget will be hard to quantify 
because it is not usually a specific line item, and the assumption has been made that it will be a 
small amount when compared to the Department of Space budget supposed in this architecture 
study.  Specifically, the web-based training and wiki for collaboration were implemented 
because of their accessibility and ubiquity for a small dollar amount, and they would be 
appropriate measures to institute.  Also, providing individuals for training exercises to ensure 
training in a denied environment is accomplished and to record and process the associated 
metrics could be implemented without the Department of Space framework.  Finally, a certain 
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level of training could be done at individual Operation Centers throughout the NSSE, but it could 
only be accomplished in a limited capacity because of the personnel costs involved and the lack 
of a centralized command structure.  Essentially, the 14th Air Force could institute a training 
initiative, but the NRO entities would not have to recognize it or conform.  For the most part, the 
training initiatives could be implemented with small up-front costs and theoretically should yield 
positive results. 
Tier 2 Improvements Without a Department of Space 
Many of the changes recommended in the Tier 2 area require the creation of a 
Department of Space as a catalyst for that change; ALL of the changes are at least helped by the 
existence of a Department of Space.  Some of our changes; however, could be done without a 
Department of Space.  The mandatory spare policy for our Group 1 and 2 satellites, for example, 
could be done with the right priority within the Air Force.  At a cost of $300-500M per satellite, 
though, it is unlikely to ever get funded over other programs.  The spare launch vehicle, on the 
other hand, really is not a “spare” but rather just buying the next vehicle early.  That could be 
done by reprogramming funds from one Fiscal Year to another.  It would put a pinch on the 
current year, but other programs could be pushed out to make it happen.  Flexible launch pads 
and facilities could be done, but at a high cost; it is in fact already being done by the commercial 
spaceports at the Cape and Vandenberg.  Each pad would likely cost $500M for renovation plus 
engineering design of the changes.  It probably would not get the support it needed for funding 
within the Air Force, given the “If it ain’t broke…” mentality.  Centralizing site management of 
the Federal launch sites is a non-starter without the Department of Space.  As long as NASA, the 
NRO and the Air Force all serve different masters and different priorities, there is really no way 
to centralize the facilities and bases that serve all three.  A common bus architecture for research 
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and development is possible without a Department of Space, but it needs to be managed by an 
NSSE wide Science and Technology organization.  Flexible launch crews that are capable and 
trained to process multiple types of launch vehicles are certainly possible without a Department 
of Space.  If the government announces the change far enough in advance and sets a cutover 
date, they would simply hire the current Boeing/Lockheed launch teams to man the new 
contracts and then train them across a variety of platforms.  Finally, improving commercial 
business at the Federal launch sites is also tenable without a Department of Space.  Financial 
incentives and management can be done today with the right government intervention.  While 
some pieces of the Tier 2 efforts could be made more responsive without a Department of Space, 
the ones with the greatest impact are impossible without the funding and prioritization that a 
Cabinet-level organization can bring to the table.     
Tier 3 Improvements Without a Department of Space  
Even if a major reorganization of US National Space systems into a department of space 
were not possible at one time, there are small steps that could be taken now to improve 
efficiency, timeliness and responsiveness of our national Tier 3 functions.   
The 2001 Space Commission Report concluded that: 
“Currently, there is no DoD appropriation that identifies and aggregates funding 
for space programs. Space funding is a part of many appropriations spread across 
the DoD and Intelligence Community Budgets… These multiple appropriations 
lead to several problems. When satellite programs are funded in one budget and 
terminals in another, the decentralized arrangement can result in program 
disconnects and duplication. It can result in lack of synchronization in the 
acquisition o of satellites and their associated terminals. It can also be difficult for 
user requirements to be incorporated into the satellite system if the organization 
funding the system does not agree with and support those user requirements. The 
current methods of budgeting for national security space programs lack the 
visibility and accountability essential to developing a coherent program.” 
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Certainly the solution for the above problem is clear.  One organization responsible for 
both acquisition and development of our national strategic space systems is required.  
Additionally, the disconnect between user requirements and requirements of the funding agency 
can cause a system to be developed and built that works perfectly as designed, but does not meet 
the needs of the customer.  
The natural solution to this problem would be for form a consolidated national space 
S&T organization, (which would become the Department of Space S&T division when the 
Department of Space is formed).  This agency would be responsible for development and 
acquisition of all national DoD, IC, and research space systems.  Many of the benefits previously 
mentioned for a consolidated Department of Space S&T division could be realized with such an 
organization.   
Acquisition is another area where improvements could be made, even short of formation 
of a Department of Space.  Current acquisition programs and processes could be examined, and 
inefficiencies identified to promote more cost effective and timely acquisition of space systems.  
Additionally, there is no acquisition process that is equipped to rapidly insert new disruptive 
technology into space, or capable of replacing an on orbit asset in a short timeframe.  Even if 
such a process were built, and funding were available, there is no efficient way to bring experts 
and other critical personnel in at very short notice to work on a high priority projects (even if just 
temporarily) to rapidly develop and build a new critical space systems. Of course if a Department 
of Space existed, it would have the authority to reallocate personnel working on other lower 
priority projects temporarily to the critical project.  Therefore some type of arrangement must be 
made with NASA, government contractors (such as Boeing and Lockheed Martin) and others 
space development experts to allow the government acquisition community to obtain their 
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services immediately (even if this means delaying other space programs of lower priority) to 
develop and build urgent and critical space systems in a national emergency or other situation 
deemed important and urgent enough to merit this unusual, expensive, yet rapid acquisition 
process.  In addition to funding and space system experts, expensive machinery (such as thermal 
vacuum chambers, shaker tables, and EMI testing facilities, and manufacturing facilities) would 
need to be immediately available for use in order to built urgent priority I space systems.  There 
are two ways to solve this problem.  The first would require the government S&T community to 
maintain government owned testing and manufacturing facilities on standby to develop, build, 
and test an urgent, high priority space system.  This option would be extraordinarily expensive, 
since these facilities would be mostly un-used.  Additionally, it would be difficult to determine 
whether the facilities built could be adequate for all types of space systems since satellites vary 
greatly in size and complexity.  The second option (and probably more reasonable of the two) 
would be to pre-arrange contracts with current government and DoD contractors who already 
own facilities necessary to develop, build and test space systems to allow immediate use of these 
facilities by the government for an urgent, high priority space system.  Since the use of these 
facilities at short notice would almost certainly delay other projects already in progress by the 
contractor, the contracted rate would probably be much higher than normal.  This option would 
also allow the government more flexibility since large contractors generally own facilities 
necessary to build everything from small to very large space systems.  
The third thing could be done immediately to increase responsiveness in the US space 
S&T community.  It would be to build an online virtual collaborative environment (VCE).  An 
online VCE would allow everyone from government acquisition, scientists, government 
contractors and engineers to quickly and effectively collaborate online about problems and 
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solutions on government space related programs.  Many of the benefits of office co-location 
could be enjoyed virtually on the VCE even though offices would not actually be co-located.  
Access to the VCE would only be allowed to verified members (i.e. contractors, Government 
employees, etc) to prevent misuse; Classified programs could be included on a VCE for Secret 
and Top Secret programs via the SIPRNET and JWICS to promote collaboration and improve 
communication efficiency.  In addition to improved collaboration, it would dramatically increase 
transparency (especially for unclassified programs).  It is difficult to know exactly how often two 
separate universities, contractors, or government labs are working on a solution to the exact same 
problem, or on a problem that has already been solved by someone else at another lab.  Such 
VCEs are already in use and have become extremely beneficial to some of the most efficient 
development companies in the world such as Google, Microsoft and Apple, and could be equally 
beneficial to government space acquisition and development. 
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X. CONCLUSION 
To provide responsive space by 2025 we must make sweeping changes to the NSSE.  All 
of these changes are not possible unless we consolidate our space organizations into one single 
organization.  We propose the Department of Space to be that organization.  At the cabinet level, 
it will have the required clout to get the funding required.  It will unite the community and allow 
one consistent vision, one set of policies, and one culture.  Having a responsive culture under one 
organization will prove to be the largest catalyst to making space as responsive as it can be.  In 
this environment, we will implement responsive policies that will enable better and quicker 
space-related services to our customers. 
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LIST OF ACRONYMS 
ACQ  Acquisition 
AFB  Air Force Base 
AFS  Air Force Station 
ASAT  Anti-Satellite 
CCAFS Cape Canaveral Air Force Station 
CIA  Central Intelligence Agency 
COMINT Communications Intelligence 
Comm  Communications 
DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
DCS  Defensive Counter Space 
DIA  Defense Intelligence Agency 
DNI  Director of National Intelligence 
DoD  Department of Defense 
DoNSp Department of National Space Operations 
DoSp  Department of Space 
EELV  Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle  
ELINT  Electronic Intelligence 
EMCON Emissions Control 
EMI  Electromagnetic Interference 
EMP  Electromagnetic Pulse 
FAA  Federal Aviation Administration 
FY  Fiscal Year 
GAO  Government Accounting Office 
GEO  Geosynchronous Orbit 
GIG  Global Information Grid  
GPS  Global Positioning System 
HALL  High Altitude Long Loiter 
HEO  Highly Elliptical Orbit 
HQ  Headquarters 
IC  Intelligence Community 
ICBM  Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 
IMINT  Image Intelligence 
ISR  Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance 
JCIDS  Joint Capabilities Integration Development System 
JFCC  Joint Functional Component Command 
JP  Joint Publication 
JROC  Joint Requirements Oversight Council 
JSpOC  Joint Space Operations Center 
JWICS  Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System 
KC  Knowledge Center 
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LC Launch Complex 
LCDR Lieutenant Commander 
LEO Low Earth Orbit 
LPI/LPD Low Probability of Detection/Low Probability of Intercept 
LSD Launch Support Division 
LT Lieutenant 
Maj/MAJ Major 
MDA Missile Defense Agency 
MEO Medium Earth Orbit 
MoE Measure of Effectiveness 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NDB National Database 
NGA National Geospatial Intelligence Agency 
NOAA National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration 
NRO National Reconnaissance 
NSA National Security Agency 
NSSE National Security Space Enterprise 
O&M Operation and Maintenance 
OA Operational Awareness 
OCS Offensive Counter Space 
OPS Operations or Operations Center 
ORS Operationally Responsive Space 
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 
PME Professional Military Education 
PNT Positioning Navigation Timing 
PPR Pre-Planned Response 
R&D Research and Development 
RSC Responsive Space Conference 
RSS Rich Site Summary 
S&T Science and Technology 
SA Situational Awareness 
SATCOM Satellite Communications 
SCIF Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility 
SCOE Space Center of Excellence 
SECDEF Secretary of Defense 
SECSPACE Secretary of the Department of Space 
SES Senior Executive Service 
SIGINT Signals Intelligence 
SIPRNET Secret Internet Protocol Router Network 
SLC Space Launch Complex 
SME Subject Matter Experts 
SpOCC Space Operations Command Center 
SSA Space Situational Awareness 
STK Satellite Tool Kit 
TacSat Tactical Satellite 
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TAD Temporary Additional Duty 
UAS Unmanned Aerial System  
UHF Ultra High Frequency 
ULA United Launch Alliance 
VCE Virtual Collaborative Environment 
Wx Weather 
  110 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  111 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Allaire, Yvan and Mihaela E Firsirotu.  “Theories of Organizational Culture.” Organizational 
Studies. 5.3 (1984): 193-226 
Ayati, Bruce P. and Paul D. Massatt.  “Feasibility of Managing a Dynamic Constellation to a 
Fixed Constellation Definition.”  ION 57th Annual Meeting/CIGTF 20th Biennial 
Guidance Test Symposium, 11-13 June 2001, Albuquerque, NM. 
Brenizer, D., S. Andrews, and G. Hogan, “A Standard Satellite Bus for National Security Space 
Missions”, MIT Lincoln Laboratory, March 2005. 
Caceres, Marco.  “Arianespace’s Good Fortune.”  Aerospace America May 2008:  16-18.      
“Cape Canaveral.” Encyclopedia Astronautica.  
<http://www.astronautix.com/sites/capveral.htm>  15 May 2008 
Crosier, Clinton.  The Achilles Heel of America’s Economic Well Being.  Newport: Naval War 
College. 21 May 2004. 
David, Leonard. “Space Weapons for Earth Wars.” 15 May 2002. Space.com. 27 Jan 2008 
<www.space.com/businesstechnology/technology/space_war_020515-1.html>   
Department of the Air Force.  “Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 Budget Estimates”. Feb. 2008.  18 May 
2008 <www.saffm.hq.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-080204-072.pdf>. 
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle.  17 May 2008. 
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/budget/fy2001/dot-e/images/01eelv.gif>   
Finnegan, Eric, Steve Vernon, Paul Schwartz, George Moretti, Kellie Turner, Thomas A. Doyne, 
“ORS/JWS Phase III Bus Standard Status”, AIAA-RS5-2007-3002, 5th Responsive Space 
Conf, Los Angeles, CA, 2007. 
  112 
Fuchs, Len and John Nicholas.  You’re a Leader… Now What? Gilbert, AZ: Real Leaders 
Institute LLC, 2006.  
Grey, Jerry.  Highlights in Space Technology and Applications 2005.  International Aeronautical 
Federation:  7 November 2005.  
Guidi, Cristina, and Darin Skelly, “Transformational Spaceport & Range Technologies”, AIAA-
RS2-2004-4002, 2nd Responsive Space Conf, Los Angeles, CA, April 2004. 
Isakowitz, Stephen J., Joshua B. Hopkins, and Joseph P. Hopkins, Jr., “International Reference 
Guide to Space Launch Systems”, Fourth Edition, AIAA, Reston, VA, 2004. 
Kolodziejski, Paul J., “Operationally Responsive Spacelift for the U.S. Air Force”, RSC1, 
Redondo Beach, CA, April 2003 
London, John R., “Reducing Space Mission Cost”, Microcosm Press, El Segundo, CA 1996. 
McCartney, Forrest, et al. “National Security Space Launch Report”. Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
Corporation, 2006. 
Organizational Culture. National Defense University.  Strategic Leadership and Decision 
Making. 10 June 2008. <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ndu/strat-ldr-
dm/pt4ch16.html> 
Prensky, Marc.  Digital Game-Based Learning.  New York: McGraw-Hill, 2001. 
Reid, T. R.  “N.M. Plans Launchpad for Space Tourism.”  Washington Post  15 December 2005:  
A03. 
Rumsfeld, Donald.  Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management 
and Organization.  January 11, 2001 
Santee, Jay. “Fourteenth Air Force Overview.” Capitalleadership.com 5 Dec 2007.  11 June 
2008. <http://capitalleadership.com/afceanova/afitdayfy08/santee.ppt> 
  113 
“Space Launch Complex 46.”  SpaceFlorida.gov. 15 May 2008. 
<http://www.spaceflorida.gov/slc46.php>   
Summers, Jeff, Greg Heinsohn and Greg Hegemann. “Launch-on-Demand; A Revolutionary 
Paradigm for Space Utilization”, AIAA-RS1-2003-3003, 1st Responsive Space Conf, 
Redondo Beach, CA, April 2003. 
Tomme, Ed. “Tactical Satellites and the Perceived Competition with Non-Orbital C4ISR 




United States Federal Aviation Administration.  2007 U.S. Commercial Space Transportation 
Developments and Concepts:  Vehicles, Technologies, and Spaceports.  2007.   
United States Government Accountability Office.  Report to the Subcommittee on Strategic 
Forces, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate: Space Acquisitions, DOD is Making 
Progress to Rapidly Deliver Low Cost Space Capabilities but Challenges Remain.  Apr. 
2008. 
United States Government Accountability Office.  Military Space Operations: Common 
Problems and Their Effects on Satellite and Related Acquisition.  June 2003.  
United States Joint Forces Command.  Joint Doctrine for Space Operations (JP 3-14).   
Washington: GPO, 9 August 2002.  
United States Office of Science and Technology Policy and National Security Council Co-
Chairs.  The Future Management and Use of the U.S. Space Launch Bases and Ranges.  8 
February 2000.   
  114 
“U.S. Satellite Program Delays & Costs Defended, Criticized” 29 Apr 2005. 
<http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/us-satellite-program-delays-costs-defended-
criticized-0433/>  17 May 2008 
Wertz, James R., “Responsive Launch Vehicle Cost Model”, Microcosm, Inc., AIAA-RS2-2004, 
2nd Responsive Space Conf, Los Angeles, CA, April 2004. 
Wertz, James R.  “ORS Mission Utility and Measures of Effectiveness.”  6th Responsive Space 
Conference, Los Angeles, CA.  28 April 2008.  
  115 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION 
1. Defense Technical Information Center       2 
8725 John J. Kingman Rd., STE 0944 
Ft. Belvoir, VA  22060-6218 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library, Code 013        2 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5100 
 
3. LT Margaret LaBrie 1  
National Reconnaissance Office 
 
4. Paul Popejoy, CTR  1 
 OSD-ATL NSSO 
